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INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining occupies an ambivalent position in the crimi-
nal justice system. Most observers of the system subscribe to its
practical benefits, but acknowledge that it is an imperfect meth-
od for dispensing justice.' The academic literature has consisted
1. See, e.g., JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 1.04 (1978)
(arguing the importance of plea bargaining to the criminal justice system); MILTON
HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DE-
FENSE ATrORNEYS 157-62 (1978).(identifying the reasons why plea bargaining is "in-
evitable"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1, at
898-904 (2d ed. 1992) (describing and critiquing the plea bargaining system); Albert
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 51
(1968) (noting that most "observers recognize that the guilty-plea system is in need
of reform, but the legal profession now seems as united in its defense of plea negoti-
ation as it was united in opposition less than a half-century ago"); Charles P.
Bubany & Frank Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecuto-
rial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 502 (1976) (calling for administra-
tive guidelines to structure plea negotiations); Theodore S. Green et al., Plea Bar-
gaining: Fairness and Inadequacy of Representation, 7 COLUM. HUmi. RTS. L. REV.
495, 507-12 (1975-76) (criticizing the quality of defense counsel in many plea bar-
gaining settings); H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1977, at 102 (analyzing various model codes gov-
erning plea bargaining); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargain-
ing Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 440 (1971) ("The advisability of attempting to
provide sufficient resources to eliminate the need for guilty pleas is doubtful.");
Frank V. Ariano & John W. Countryman, Note, The Role of Plea Negotiation in
Modern Criminal Law, 46 CM.-KENT L. REV. 116, 122 (1969) (accepting the necessi-
ty of plea bargaining, while also noting problems with the practice); John A.
Lundquist, Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion-A Re-evaluation of the Prosecutor's
Unbridled Discretion and its Potential for Abuse, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 485, 517-18
(1971) (criticizing prosecutorial discretion as a part of plea bargaining, but conceding
its necessity for the operation of the criminal justice system); cf Stephen J.
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largely of attempts to provide a theoretical justification for plea
bargaining2 and, conversely, of calls for the system's abolition.'
This Article accepts plea bargaining as a given. It focuses on
the ethical role of prosecutors who find, in particular cases, that
the system is not operating in its expected fashion. Courts4 and
professional responsibility codes' impose on prosecutors an un-
defined obligation to "do justice."' In the trial context, that obli-
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
43, 80-81 (1988) (describing market failures and other flaws inherent in plea-bargain-
ing system).
2. See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 L. & SocY
REV. 509, 511 (1979) (reviewing empirical evidence and defending the rationality of
the plea bargaining system against critics); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure
as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 308-09 (1983) (arguing that plea-bargain-
ing is desirable as a mechanism for setting the price of crime); Robert E. Scott & Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910-11 (1992) (set-
ting forth a contract theory of plea bargaining and urging structural modifications to
account for innocent defendants); cf William F. McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluff-
ing and the Case against Plea-Bargaining, in PLEA-BARGAINING 1, 21-22 (William F.
McDonald & James A. Cramer eds., 1980) (defending plea bargaining against the
criticism that prosecutors induce unjust bargains through bluffing).
3. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,
84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1313-14 (1975) (arguing that the plea bargain system must be
reformed or eliminated); Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 L.
& SocY REv. 555, 563-64 (1979) (arguing that plea bargaining undermines citizens'
"inalienable rights"); Raymond I. Parnas & Riley J. Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargain-
ing: A Proposal, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 102, 114-15 (1978) (calling for the abolition
of plea bargaining and arguing for a "charge-setting" procedure early in the criminal
process); Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 80 (challenging the factual validity of the plea
bargaining system); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE
L.J. 1979, 2008-09 (1992) (criticizing the contract defense of plea bargaining); cf
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 50-53 (revealing significant conflicts in prosecutors' per-
ceived roles within plea bargaining context); David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea
Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 115, 133 (1994) (arguing
for reduced reliance on plea bargaining).
4. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("IThe prosecution's
interest.., is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."); People
v. Pelchat, 464 N.E.2d 447, 451 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that the prosecutor "is charged
with the duty not only to seek convictions but also to see that justice is done").
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1995) (character-
izing prosecutors as "minister[s] of justice"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
sIBn='rY DR 7-103(A) (1981).
6. For discussions of the prosecutorial duty to serve justice, see Professional Re-
sponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958) (discuss-
ing prosecutors' "dual role"). See also J. Allison DeFoor II, Prosecutorial Misconduct
in Closing Argument, 7 NOVA L.J. 443, 448 (1983) (citing prosecutor's "semijudicial
position" under Florida law); George T. Frampton, Jr., Some Practical and Ethical
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gation is best understood in terms of the adversarial process.7
The plea-bargaining stage, however, does not fit the adversarial
model,' nor is its goal the same.9 It is therefore unclear what
duties, if any, prosecutors have to defendants involved in plea
bargaining, or to the legal system, other than to believe that a
defendant is guilty before accepting a plea.
Consider just one example:
A defense counsel acts ineffectively during pretrial represen-
tation by failing to request discovery or exculpatory material.
The prosecutor knows that, ordinarily, he would have to pro-
duce exculpatory material to the defense but also knows that
in this case defense counsel is unaware of the material.
Problems of Prosecuting Public Officials, 36 MD. L. REV. 5, 7 (1976) (characterizing
prosecutor's role as the administration of the criminal justice system).
7. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 56-65 (1991) (analyzing
prosecutors' duty to "do justice" at trial).
8. Under the theory of the adversarial model, equal adversaries introduce con-
flicting versions of the facts and law for decision by a neutral and passive arbitra-
tor. See id. at 60-61 (identifying the essential premises of the adversarial model). In
plea bargaining, the adversaries may be equally at odds, but there is no arbitrator
to draw the best from their presentations, to ensure that they "play fair," or to
make a decision on the merits. See id. at 62 ("the divergence from the core expecta-
tions may undermine valid competitive adjudication"); cf Roberta K Flowers, A Code
of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of
Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 927 (1996) (arguing that ethics codes
should be amended to require non-adversarial lawyering by prosecutors during the
investigative stage of prosecutions).
9. As discussed below, there are various justifications for plea bargaining. See
infra Part II. At root, however, most seek to justify the systemic goal of preserving
resources through the use of plea bargaining. See BOND, supra note 1, § 1.04, at 5-7;
Ariano & Countryman, supra note 1, at 122. The adversarial trial-.nodel, in con-
trast, is justified either as achieving fair results or honoring individuality and auton-
omy in legal process. See, e.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 117 (1980) (discussing justifications for the adversary system
other than truthseeking); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DEscRIP-
TION AND DEFENSE 1-6 (1984) (analyzing the theory of the adversary system); Lon L.
Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 35, 40 (Harold J.
Berman ed., 1972) (discussing ways the adversary system produces truth); David
Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND
LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 92-93 (David Luban ed., 1984) (discussing and debunking the
typical justifications for the adversary system); Zacharias, supra note 7, at 53-56
(discussing the justifications for the adversary system).
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The law of criminal discovery does not always require disclosure
of helpful information prior to the defendant's plea.'0 The hypo-
thetical prosecutor, if she" believes the defendant to be
10. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), prosecutors must disclose "evi-
dence favorable to an accused ... material either to guilt or to punishment. .. ."
Id. at 87. However, in most cases, defense counsel must make a specific request for
exculpatory material before it becomes discoverable. See id. at 87-88. Only if the
information in and of itself "creates a reasonable doubt" of the guilt of the accused
need the prosecutor disclose material in the absence of a request. United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). In the scenario discussed in the text, only informa-
tion in the latter category would have to be disclosed.
Courts are split on the issue of when Brady information must be disclosed. A
few courts suggest that a prosecutor must disclose "clearly exculpatory" evidence be-
fore accepting any plea. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information to be a
potential basis for vacating a plea); Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cr. 1992)
(holding that a defendant must be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea when the
prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory material caused the defendant to plead
guilty when there is a reasonable probability that he would have "insisted on going
to trial" had the prosecutor disclosed the material); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp.
590, 598 (W.D.N.Y.) ("[A] prosecutor has a duty, during the course of plea bargain-
ing, to disclose to the defendant evidence that is as clearly exculpatory of certain
elements of the crime charged as is the contested evidence in this case."), aft'd, 565
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977); People v. Benard, 620 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (1994) (accepting
the theory that plea agreement can be vitiated by prosecutor's failure to disclose).
Most courts, however, suggest that the information need not be disclosed until the
time of trial. See, e.g., Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that prosecutorial nondisclosure that would have constituted a Brady viola-
tion at trial was insufficient to compromise an otherwise voluntary plea agreement);
United States v. Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303, 1313 (7th Cr. 1977) (holding that the de-
fendant is not entitled to know the strength of the government's case before deciding
whether to plead guilty); United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., 726 F. Supp. 1424,
1442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that Brady material need not be produced for the
defendant by the prosecution immediately); United States v. Ayala, 690 F. Supp.
1014, 1016 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("A violation of Brady would not affect the consensual
nature of the plea thereby impairing its validity."); United States v. Wolczik, 480 F.
Supp. 1205, 1210 (W.D. Pa. 1979) ("[A] defendant cannot expect to obtain Brady ma-
terial for use in a pretrial decision to plead guilty."); People v. Simone, 401 N.Y.S.2d
130, 134 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (noting that "many courts have declined to impose a pre-
trial duty on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory material"), aft'd, 71 A.D.2d 554
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979); cf White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 421-22 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that resolution of the issue depended in part upon the nature of the
evidence that the prosecutor failed to disclose); United States v. Autullo, Nos. 88 CR
91-4, 93 C4415, 1993 WL 453446, at *2 (N.D. 11. Nov. 4, 1993) (holding that by
pleading guilty, a defendant waives his Brady claim).
11. To avoid confusion, throughout this Article, I refer to the prosecutor in the
female gender. Other actors in the process (e.g., defense counsel and defendants) are
treated as male.
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guilty, 2 could convince the defendant to accept a plea higher
than he would accept if aware of the information-and higher
than other, better-represented defendants would have to accept.
Do, or should, the prosecutor's obligations to justice require her
to take steps that might keep her from maximizing the
defendant's punishment?
To resolve this issue, the prosecutor needs to be able to refer
either to a theory of what just plea bargaining is all about or to
a theory of how bargaining, in general, achieves appropriate re-
sults. Part I of this Article discusses negotiation in the civil con-
text, analyzes whether traditional bargaining notions apply
equally to criminal cases, and considers whether those notions
obviate the need for special conduct by prosecutors in plea bar-
gaining. Part I concludes that society's presumptive tolerance for
civil pretrial settlements cannot extend to the criminal context.
Part II considers the dominant justifications for plea bargain-
ing, identifies their premises, and attempts to identify a concept
of justice that fits those justifications. Part III analyzes these
different justifications using a series of hypothetical scenarios
that might implicate the prosecutor's obligation to do justice. In
part, examining how these justifications work in practice illus-
trates weaknesses-or lack of definition-in some of the ratio-
nales themselves. More importantly for this Article, however,
the analysis suggests that just behavior by prosecutors depends,
in a very concrete way, upon the theory under which they oper-
ate. Prosecutors cannot identify proper conduct unless they have
a clear notion of what plea bargaining should accomplish.
Part IV thus offers a practical solution to the problem of doing
justice. It argues that prosecution offices, in their internal guide-
12. Most professional codes impose upon prosecutors some initial responsibility to
believe in a defendant's guilt, or likely guilt, before pressing the prosecution. See,
e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (1995) (forbidding prose-
cutors to prosecute "a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1981) (stating
that a prosecutor "shall not institute . . . criminal charges when he knows . . . that
the charges are not supported by probable cause"); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 3-3.9(a) (3d ed.
1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE] ("A prosecutor should
not . . permit the continued pendency of criminal charges . . . in the absence of
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.").
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lines or procedures, should set forth the plea-bargaining theory
or theories that justify the offices' participation in the process. 3
In contrast to the status quo, that simple step would enable in-
dividual prosecutors to respond to specific plea-bargaining di-
lemmas and to make meaningful determinations of what consti-
tutes justice in the individual case.
Even if prosecutorial agencies resist adopting a policy, individ-
ual prosecutors will be able to use this Article's analysis to deal
with many of the dilemmas they face. In selecting a theory of
plea bargaining, individual prosecutors would need to reflect on
the goals they seek to achieve in plea bargaining. Part V con-
cludes that society is better off when prosecutors are self-con-
scious about their ends, because such reflection helps prevent
arbitrary behavior and renders prosecutors less subject to cor-
ruption or manipulation. At a minimum, identifying plea-bar-
gaining priorities will encourage negotiating prosecutors to rea-
son and act in an internally consistent way. 4
I. DITINGUIHING PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Most of the literature regarding negotiation in civil litigation
tends to assume that pretrial settlements are good, or appropri-
ate, results. 5 If one could make a similar, definitional assump-
13. Twenty-five years ago, Welsh White proposed that prosecutors' offices should
"formulate plea bargaining policies" in order to reduce the pernicious effects of unbri-
dled prosecutorial discretion. White, supra note 1, at 457. Professor White focused on
the need for some policy, rather than on the separate question of where prosecutors'
offices should look for guidance in setting their policies. See id. at 457-58. This Arti-
cle, in contrast, considers the substantive issue of what would constitute just plea
bargaining and offers specific content for the content of plea bargaining policies.
14. This Article, of course, addresses the many well-intentioned prosecutors who
take the duty to do justice seriously. Prosecutors who wish only to justify the results
that they pursue can be constrained only through specific, enforceable, and enforced
rules of conduct. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 107-09 (discussing the effects of
ethical codes on scrupulous and unscrupulous attorneys).
15. See, e.g., XAVIER M. FRASCOGNA, JR. & H. LEE HETHERINGTON, NEGOTIATION
STRATEGY FOR LAWYERS 205 (1984) (assuming that "[elveryone has something to gain
from striking a deal"); ROGER S. HAYDOCK, NEGOTIATION PRACTICE 1 (1984)
("[Tihrough the negotiation process 'things can only get better' for clients."); Oran R.
Young, Introduction: Manipulative Models of Bargaining, in BARGAINING: FORMAL
THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 303-07 (Oran R. Young ed., 1975) (analyzing game and
bargaining theories and assuming that the goal of outnegotiating the adversary is
1998] 1127
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tion about criminal case settlements reached through plea bar-
gaining, then the need to identify the meaning of plea-bargain-
ing justice would disappear.
In approving civil settlements, most commentators have point-
ed to the resource-saving nature of settlements, the anguish
avoided, and the speed with which negotiated dispositions can
be achieved. 6 These benefits, though real, do not alone explain
a societal preference for settlement, because the same benefits
could be achieved equally well by resolving disputes through a
coin flip. Something about the quality of the resolution itself
must justify society's preference.
At its root, the substantive rationale for favoring civil settle-
ments is probably identical to the rationale for upholding con-
tracts." Two parties can maximize their total utility in the use
appropriate); Otomar J. Bartos, Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of
View, 21 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 565, 576 (1977) (postulating that "most men will find
Nash solution fair"); cf Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A
Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases 3or Trial, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 319, 320 (1991) ("[L]awyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial set-
tlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.").
16. See, e.g., LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BusI-
NESS, FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 10-11 (1990) (discussing the savings realized
through negotiating a settlement); SAMUEL D. THURMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 250-51 (1970) (discussing the importance of settle-
ments in saving money, time, emotional distress, and judicial resources); Edward C.
King & Don W. Sears, The Ethical Aspects of Compromise, Settlement, and Arbitra-
tion, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 454, 456-57 (1953) (discussing the ethical propriety of
cost savings that settlements realize when compared with litigation); Allen M. Lin-
den, In Praise of Settlement: Towards Cooperation, Away from Confrontation, 7 CAN.
COMMUNITY L.J. 4, 4-7 (1984) (approving settlements as avoiding cost, needless ex-
penditure of time, and anxiety); cf Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that settlement is not "preferable to judgment" and
should be treated "as a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets").
47 See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSEL-
ING, AND NEGOTIATING 358 (1990) (describing the "economic approach to negotiating
[as] addressfing] conflicts where ... each [party] would prefer to reach an agree-
ment rather than accept a deadlock"); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To
LAW AND ECONOMICS 109-12 (2d ed. 1989) (applying an economic efficiency model to
civil litigation settlements); John G. Cross, Negotiation as a Learning Process, 21 J.
CONFLICT RES. 581, 585 (1977) (describing the perspective that the bargaining pro-
cess is a "mechanism for dividing the fruits of cooperation"); Gary T. Lowenthal, A
General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behauior, 31 U. KAN. L. REV.
69, 73-74 (1982) (discussing the maximization of all involved interests achieved
through noncompetitive negotiations); cf People v. Evans, 673 N.E.2d 244, 247 (Ill.
1996) (noting that "plea agreements . . . are governed to some extent by contract
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of their separate resources when they trade assets and servic-
es."s If each party has access to full information and can assess
his own preferences, then contract law assumes that any agree-
ment will make both parties better off. 9 A settlement is
societally efficient, compared to the alternative of requiring each
party to keep what they have; namely, their chance of winning
at trial, with all attendant risks and benefits." So long as both
parties end up in relatively better positions, society does not
care who got the better of the deal.2
This economic model does not apply equally in the criminal
setting for a variety of reasons. First, the model assumes, at a
minimum, fully available information by both negotiating par-
ties.' Civil contract theory has developed a substantial corn-
law principles") (citations omitted).
18. See, e.g., BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 377 (discussing the goal of
self-maximization within the context of adversarial negotiation); MARVIN A.
CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2 (2d ed.
1993) ("The trading process is not a poker game in which one player wins what an-
other loses; rather, it is a kind of joint undertaking which increases the wealth of
both parties and from which both emerge with a measure of enhanced utility.");
CHESTER L. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME 141-45 (1970) (analyzing ways bar-
gaining can maximize each party's preferences); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (4th ed. 1992) ("[R]esources tend to gravitate toward their most
valuable uses if voluntary exchange . . . is permitted."); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the ways negotiations help iden-
tify "focal points" that benefit both sides); I. William Zartman, Negotiation as a Joint
Decision-Making Process, 21 J. CONFLICT RES. 619, 622 (1977) (discussing negotiation
as a "positive-sum exercise").
19. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, at 59.
20. See THURMfAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 250-51.
21. See, e.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Settlement Negotia-
tions with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribu-
tion, and Efficiency, 14 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 283, 286 (1994) (noting the assump-
tion that "the social objective function is ... indifferent about the distribution of
wealth").
22. Different bargaining models make varying assumptions about the kind of infor-
mation that the parties must have. See Oran R. Young, Strategic Interaction and
Bargaining, in BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 15, at 1,
10 (1975) (noting, in the introduction to an anthology of bargaining theories, "the
widespread habit of assuming perfect information along all dimensions . .. in con-
structing models of rational decisionmaking"). In any negotiation, the parties have
differing expectations regarding the value of a well-understod product. See KARRAS,
supra note 18, at 142-43. Sometimes, in addition, the parties are aware that their
intelligence about the item may be inferior to the adversary's. See BASTRESS &
HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 367 ("Bargaining theory is premised on the existence
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mon law addressing the problems that exist when this assump-
tion is not satisfiedY.2  The criminal context, however, builds on
of imperfect information . . . ."). The bargaining models mostly expect these negotia-
tors to adjust their bargaining positions accordingly. See id. For some of the growing
mathematical and economic literature analyzing information disparities between ne-
gotiating litigants, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imper-
fect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 414 (1984) (analyzing the effects of informa-
tion asymmetry on settlement negotiations); I. P. L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit,
Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539, 549 (1983) (applying game theory "with
incomplete information"); Urs Schweizer, Litigation and Settlement Under Two-Sided
Incomplete Information, 56 REV. ECON. STUD. 163, 175 (1989) (concerning "a game of
litigation and settlement under two-sided incomplete information"); Gyu Ho Wang et
al., Litigation and Pretrial Negotiation under Incomplete Information, 10 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 187, 187-88 (1994).
The game theory model of bargaining assumes a nearly perfect information sys-
tem. See C.E. FERGUSON & J.P. GOULD, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 327 (5th ed. 1980)
(elaborating on the assumption of full information under game theory). Under an
economic, contract theory of bargaining, this assumption is relaxed somewhat and is
replaced by an assumption that each attorney will adjust his expectations in bar-
gaining based on his assessment that the other side has an informational advantage.
See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 361 (noting that "[t]he economic mod-
el of bargaining . ..builds in a dynamic for adjusting the previously developed 'con-
fident expectations'"); Cross, supra note 17, at 597 ("[A]s anticipated settlement dates
approach, however, the parties will get down to business, and the information flows
will become much more reliable."); Young, supra, at 13, 16 (outlining the "outguess-
ing regress" that may become part of strategic bargaining). A third, psychological
theory of bargaining assumes imperfect information, in the sense that each lawyer
tries to manipulate the adversary's perceptions. See, e.g., Young, supra note 15, at
303-04 (describing the manipulation). Yet, the manipulation is of the perception, or
inferences to be drawn from information, rather than of the basic information itself.
Cf Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REv. 281, 282-83
(1956) (distinguishing between deceiving the adversary on the facts and bluffing
about their importance). The theory assumes that each side knows of the potential
for manipulation and will adjust their expectations upwards or will investigate for
further information as the attempted manipulation takes place. See BASTRESS &
HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 367 (discussing informational disparities in bargaining);
cf G.L.S. Shackle, Foreword to ALAN CODDINGTON, THEORIES OF THE BARGAINING
PROCESS at viii-x (1968) (analyzing how an economically optimizing agreement can
be reached when the assumption of full information is not satisfied).
23. The legal doctrines that may apply where one side to a contract takes advan-
tage of a significant information disparity include: misrepresentation, both intentional
and unintentional, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162-64 (1981); mis-
take, see id. §§ 152-53; and unconscionability, see id. § 208. Normally, parties to a
contract have no duty to disclose information. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-20 (3d ed. 1987). However, concealing in-
formation or interfering with the other party's access to it may vitiate the contract.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 160, 164 (1981); W. Page Keeton,
Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1936) (discussing
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the premise that information typically is not accessible.' In
most jurisdictions, bilateral discovery is limited severely."
Each party dominates access to the witnesses who have informa-
tion benefitting its side.26 The theoretical framework of civil
bargaining-however counterfactual it may be27 -thus differs in
liability for concealing information prior to contract). Moreover, numerous statutes
require disclosure in situations in which one party has a significant information
advantage. See CALALRI & PERILLO, supra, § 9-20; cf Scott and Stuntz, supra note
2, at 1921-24 (discussing unconscionability resulting from information deficits and
applying the doctrine to plea-bargaining theory); id. at 1957-60 (describing material
mistake doctrine and analyzing its effect on plea bargaining).
24. It is perhaps for this reason that Candace McCoy views much of plea bar-
gaining as "bad plea bargaining." CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING
xvii (1993). She argues:
The most important characteristic of good plea bargaining is that the
attorneys and the judge have thoroughly investigated, analyzed, and dis-
cussed the case. Only then can they know its facts, what is likely to be
proven, what legal defenses may be plausible, and what a fair sentence
would be. If they do not address these issues fully, they have not ac-
corded the defendant . . . due process ....
Id. at xvi-xvii.
25. See, e.g., State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884-86 (N.J. 1953) (noting and explain-
ing reasons for limited criminal discovery); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 20.2,
at 843-46 (surveying variations among criminal discovery rules); William J. Brennan,
Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.
L.Q. 279, 285 (arguing for broader discovery in criminal cases); Stephen Gillers, The
Prosecution and Defense Functions: Do they Promote Justice?, 42 REc. ASSN B. CITY
N.Y. 626, 633 (1987) (summarizing a proposal by Richard Uviller that discovery be
liberalized in criminal cases); Uviller, supra note 1, at 115 (discussing limited discov-
ery requirements in criminal cases); Zacharias, supra note 7, at 74-77 (discussing the
prosecutor's obligation to do justice with respect to discovery issues); Eleanor J.
Ostrow, Comment, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1622 (1981)
(arguing for increased discovery before the acceptance of a plea).
26. In theory, neither side may block access to its witnesses. See, e.g., Gregory v.
United States, 369 F.2d 185, 187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing a conviction when the
prosecution instructed a witness not to speak with the defense); State v. York, 632
P.2d 1261, 1263-65 (Or. 1981) (holding that the prosecution may not "order or advise
a witness not to speak to the defense"); People v. Peter, 303 N.E.2d 398, 403-04 (Ill.
1973) (implementing an Illinois statute forbidding the prosecution to prevent access to
witnesses). In practice, however, prosecution and defense witnesses tend to align
themselves with the side for which they are testifying and readily accept indications
from the lawyers that they "have no obligation" to speak with the adversary. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrak, 408 F. Supp. 476, 481-82 (D.N.J. 1976) (al-
lowing the refusal of a witness to cooperate with the defense); State v. Reichenberger,
182 N.W.2d 692, 695-96 (Minn. 1970) (approving the prosecutor's suggestion that wit-
ness not speak to defense counsel outside of the prosecutor's presence).
27. The practical reality of civil litigation may bring it closer to the criminal set-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1121
its core premises from criminal plea bargaining.
Second, the range of bargaining is limited in criminal prosecu-
tions. In most civil cases, the parties can reach a settlement for
any dollar amount between total victory and total capitulation.
Pleas in criminal cases ordinarily represent an all or nothing
choice between accepting guilt or establishing innocence.' A
range of pleadable offenses and sentences may exist, but stigma
and incarceration usually will result from any type of plea. One
therefore cannot blithely assume that a middle ground exists
somewhere in the spectrum of results that will make both the
prosecution and defendant better off.
A related factor distinguishing criminal negotiations from most
civil negotiations is the difficulty of quantifying and comparing
the benefits that the parties receive from a plea agreement. 9
The prosecutor is charged with achieving a result that satisfies
society's sometimes conflicting desires for vengeance, deterrence,
and fairness. 0 The defendant seeks to minimize incarceration,
loss of reputation, and damage to his personal affairs. These fac-
tors cannot be measured in comparable units, so society may not
be able to tell when a trade-off between the prosecutor's prefer-
ting. Numerous scholars have noted the prevalence of information asymmetries in civil
litigation, which may result in cases being settled with significant facts undiscovered.
See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 789, 812-24 (discussing
lawyers' perceptions concerning whether, in most litigation, one party has significant
information that the other side does not have); Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse:
Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 REV. LITIG. 1, 21-22 (1982) (discussing inefficiencies in
discovery). In the criminal context, most defendants at least have some information
that the prosecution does not have, namely, whether they committed the crime. This
may serve to counterbalance prosecution informational advantages. Similarly, some
civil defendants, particularly corporate defendants sued for employee misconduct, may
not be able to discover the basic truth or falsity of plaintiffs claims. In some cases,
therefore, the assumption that civil litigants have more information than criminal
litigants does not flow from the mere availability of broader civil discovery.
28. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
169, 179-80 (1997) (noting an absence of intermediate solutions in criminal cases). In
a few situations, usually involving first offenders and non-serious offenses, diversion-
ary programs that limit the stigmatic effect of a plea may be available.
29. Cf BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 377 ("[Aldversarial theories as-
sume that the parties to a negotiation want the same thing and possess the same
values.").
30. See Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537,
538-39 (1986) (discussing multiple constituents and goals of prosecutors).
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ences and the defendant's preferences enhance total utility."'
From a societal perspective, one cannot even assume that an in-
crease in the defendant's utility is a good thing. 2
Finally, arguably, a plea bargain itself should not be conceptu-
alized as a voluntary agreement, because of its coercive ele-
ments. Both the prosecution and plaintiffs in civil suits force
defendants into bargaining by filing their lawsuits. Once civil
litigation commences, however, adversarial theory assumes that
the opposing litigants can inflict equal costs upon each other for
proceeding to trial.33 The prosecution, in contrast, can exercise
31. This, in part, arises from the fact that the prosecutor simultaneously may rep-
resent constituencies with differing utility curves. The victim and some portions of
society may place a premium on vengeance, although other portions of society may
consider vengeance unimportant, or even antisocial. (Consider, for example, the view
in some segments of the community that O.J. Simpson's prosecution was racist). The
prosecutor also may have to factor in the concurrent views of the defendant's family,
for whom the defendant's incarceration imposes separate costs.
32. In the contract setting, for example, one would assume that if a trade leaves
Party A as he was and improves the position of Party B, then the trade by defini-
tion serves societal utility. In the plea bargaining setting, a deal that improves the
defendant's position may in fact disserve the public by letting a dangerous person go
free or exacting a lesser degree of vengeance.
33. Cf Zartman, supra note 18, at 622 (noting that in the ideal negotiation,
"[b]oth sides have power over each other"). One side in the litigation may well be in
a better position to bear or withstand the costs, but, in theory, each side's potential
weapons are roughly the same. See, e.g., Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and
the Practice of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' RULES AND LAWYERS' ETHIcS,
supra note 9, at 172, 177 (discussing the adversary system's premises of equal quali-
ty and quantity of resources).
Numerous commentators have challenged the theory of the adversary system in
civil litigation on the grounds that resources are rarely equal and that one litigant
can frequently impose his will upon the other. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 16, at
1075-78 (arguing against wholesale approval of settlements because consent to settle-
ments "is often coerced" and a product of an "imbalance of power" between the par-
ties); Marvin E. Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 516, 518 (1976) (noting that the civil litigation system loses its moral justifica-
tion when parties' resources are unequal); Luban, supra note 9, at 93-97 (noting
some of the challenges to the justifications for the adversary system). The common
reality of one side's discovery advantage in large litigation, one side's unilateral ac-
cess to the threat of punitive damages, and the financial disparities between most
litigants lends credence to the commentators' argument.
Nevertheless, analyzing the discrepancy between the theory and practice of the
civil litigation system is beyond the scope of this Article. Determining that the ad-
versary system as a whole relies on a fiction would require us to reexamine, and
perhaps ultimately replace, the system in civil and criminal litigation alike. Because
this Article focuses only on bargaining in the criminal context, it is sufficient for our
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coercion unilaterally for the purpose of encouraging a settlement;
for example, by threatening lengthy pretrial detention' and in-
terfering with the defendant's ability to earn his livelihood. The
defendant can do nothing in response, other than to refuse a plea.
Thus, in a limited sense, 5 plea bargaining is inherently unequal.
Defendants may be forced to agree to a settlement reflecting
something other than their evaluation of the objective benefits of
purposes to conclude that aspects of the criminal system make plea bargaining in-
herently unequal-perhaps more obviously so than bargaining in civil litigation. As a
consequence, we cannot assume that plea bargaining works according to the overall
theory of a well-working civil adversarial system.
34. See White, supra note 1, at 450 (noting that "[tihe prosecutor's unrestrained
discretion may also reinforce his tendency to take advantage of the relatively inef-
fective bargaining position of defendants unable to make bail"). The starkest exam-
ple of such coercion occurs when a defendant may be incarcerated for a longer
period in pretrial detention than he can receive as the maximum sentence upon
plea or conviction.
35. I do not suggest, as some commentators have, that a plea bargain is inherently
coercive because the defendant must choose among unpleasant choices. Cf Donald G.
Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 38, 55 (arguing that most plea bargains are unconscio-
nable because they are a product of unequal bargaining power and involuntary be-
cause defendants have no real concept as to the reality of their situation, understand-
ing only the possible penalties for not plea bargaining); Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal
Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 97-100 (1976) (arguing that pleas are
the product of duress). Regardless of whether he pleads, the defendant is in a position
that encompasses the risk of conviction; this is a fact of life with which the defendant
literally must deal with as best he can. See Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of
Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 L. & SoC'y REV. 527, 546-47
(1979) (explaining why plea bargains are not inherently coercive as long as certain
criteria are met); Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 311-17 (arguing that a plea is no
more coercive than the threatened sentence after trial); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold
Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the
Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 699 (1975) (noting that the possibility of conviction
and sentence "is part of any accused's reality in the plea bargain setting"); Schulhofer,
supra note 1, at 70 (criticizing plea bargaining, but conceding problems in labeling it
as inherently coercive); Alan Wertheimer, The Prosecutor and the Gunman, 89 ETHICS
269, 278-79 (1979) (arguing that plea bargaining is not coercive because the
prosecutor's threat is legitimate); cf. Michael Philips, The Question of Voluntariness in
the Plea Bargaining Controversy: A Philosophical Clarification, 16 L. & Soc'Y REV.
207, 219 (1981-82) (distinguishing voluntariness in the legal and voluntary senses).
My point simply is that the prosecutor is in a position to up the ante in a way that
may distort the attractiveness of the choices available to the defendant on the basis of
issues only tangentially related to the merits. Cf Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good
Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 865 (1995) (arguing that a prosecutor's ability to "over-
charge" allows the prosecutor to "control the plea context").
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pleading guilty. To be equivalent to the civil litigant's evaluation,
the calculus would need to be based more on the defendant's risk
averseness and his assessment of the chances at trial.
5
These observations are not intended to suggest that plea bar-
gaining is inappropriate. They instead suggest simply that one
cannot make the same assumption of appropriateness that typical-
ly is made regarding civil settlements. The fact that the parties
have reached an agreement does not mean presumptively that a
settlement is a good thing. To accept plea bargaining as achieving
just results, one either must modify the contract theory or identify
other rationales for the negotiating process. Part II of this Article
discusses some of the other possible justifications, as well as a ra-
tionale for plea bargaining that builds upon the contract model. 7
II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PLEA BARGAINING
In order to identify a lodestar for determining the justness of
plea bargain process or results, one must be able to refer to par-
ticular premises or expectations regarding how the plea-bargain-
ing system should work. These premises change as one considers
different rationales for the plea-bargaining system.
36. I hasten to recognize that the distinction between the civil and criminal con-
texts does not always hold true. See supra note 33. There are civil cases in which
one party can pressure the other into conceding. The most notable recent example
was the Office of Thrift Supervision's seizure of the assets of the Kaye, Scholer law
firm as a means to force the law firm to settle an administrative proceeding. See
Joyce A. Hughes, Law Firm Kaye, Scholer, Lincoln S & L and the OTS, 7 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 177 (1993); Charles R. Zubrzycki, Current Develop-
ment, The Kaye, Sciler Case: Attorney's Ethical Duties to Third Parties in Regula-
tory Situations, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 977, 979-80 (1993); see also Dennis E.
Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office of Thrift Super-
vision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 985-1001 (1993) (de-
tailing the history of the Kaye, Scholer seizure and settlement); Fred C. Zacharias,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 368-69 (1994) (detailing the history
of Kaye, Scholer seizure and settlement). Similarly, claims of wrongdoing against
celebrities frequently have resulted in quick and private settlements because the de-
fendant cannot afford the negative publicity. Cf Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Pro-
fessionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1323 n.67 (1995)
(describing settlements purchased by wealthy public figures). The exercise of injunc-
tive power and the threat of punitive damages also can bring significant pressure to
bear on parties in civil settlement negotiations. It is, however, fair to assert that the
unequal bargaining power is heightened and more universal in the criminal context.
37. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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As Figure I illustrates, justifications for plea bargaining can
be divided into two categories. First, some justifications assume
that the plea-bargaining process will bring about an appropriate,
perhaps even an optimal, result as measured by the traditional
purposes of criminal prosecution and punishment. Some propo-
nents of plea bargaining argue that the system reflects the likely
results of the trial system, but at a lower cost.3" Others suggest
that flexible plea bargaining produces results for defendants
that are fairer than the results of the trial process because: (1)
prosecutors will take equitable factors into account in pleas that
simultaneously encompass guilt and sentencing issues;39 and
(2) prosecutors will equalize results among similarly situated
defendants and limit the effects of rigid legislation.0 Finally,
some commentators suggest that a plea-bargaining system em-
powers defendants by giving them choices regarding the outcome
over which they have no control in the trial process.4
38. See, e.g., Church, supra note 2, at 512 (stating that negotiated dispositions in
a properly constructed system will approximate the probable results of trial); cf Rob-
ert B. Gordon, Private Settlement as Alternative Adjudication: A Rationale for Nego-
tiation Ethics, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 503, 504 (1985) (arguing that "a proper goal
of negotiation is to produce a pattern of outcomes that reflects the would-be results
of the controversies were they formally litigated").
39. See, e.g., LAFAVE & -ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 21.1, at 900 (discussing
flexibility inherent in plea bargaining that enables prosecutors to achieve fair,
intermediate judgments that are unavailable at trial); Alschuler, supra note 1, at
71 ("Plea negotiation plainly has a marked advantage over traditional forms of
adjudication in that it . . . affords a far greater range of alternatives than do
most trial proceedings."); Gifford, supra note 35, at 45 (citing the prosecutor's
ability to adjust pleas based on equitable factors as "[tihe key to understanding
the so-called 'plea bargaining' process").
40. See, e.g., Bubany & Skillern, supra note 1, at 482 (noting that plea bargaining
is "[jiustified in the name of individualized treatment"); Gifford, supra note 35, at 61
(arguing that prosecutors in plea bargaining should be guided by the principle that
"the criminal justice system should treat similarly situated defendants in an equal
manner"); Lundquist, supra note 1, at 514 (arguing that notions of equality have
been forgotten in the practice of plea bargaining); cf Norman Abrams, Internal Poli-
cy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1971)
(arguing the importance of consistency in prosecutorial decision making).
41. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 35, at 685 (arguing that the rules governing
plea bargaining "are rooted in a basic commitment . . . to respect human dignity by
protecting the right of every adult to determine what he shall do and what may be
done to him").
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42. This rationale hereinafter is referred to as the "trial approximation theory."
43. This rationale hereinafter is referred to as the "equity theory."
44. This rationale hereinafter is referred to as the "equality theory" or "equaliza-
tion theory."
45. This rationale hereinafter is referred to as the "empowerment theory."
46. This rationale hereinafter is referred to as the "inevitability theory."
47. This rationale hereinafter is referred to as the "Easterbrook theory."
48. This rationale hereinafter is referred to as the "contract theory."
FIGURE I - JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PLEA BARGAINING
Just Result Theories
1. Bargains reflect what would happen at trial.42
2. Prosecutors (P) can take equitable factors into account
in deciding upon a combined guilt and sentence plea.43
3. P can equalize among Defendants (D) and limit the
effect of unfair legislation."
4. Bargaining empowers the participants.45
Resource/Efficiency Theories
5. Bargaining is inevitable/people would do it anyway.4"
6. Bargaining saves resources.
7. Bargaining maximizes deterrence, releases resources,
and is not unfair to Ds.47
8. Bargaining makes both parties better off than would
proceeding to trial.48
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The second category of justifications rests on notions of effi-
ciency or resource preservation. A few proponents of the system
simply accept plea bargaining as inevitable, in the sense that
prosecutors and defendants would find a way to bargain even in
the absence of an accepted plea bargaining process. 9 Most effi-
ciency-oriented proponents, however, focus on the comparative
costs of convictions obtained through pleas and convictions ob-
tained after trial. At the most basic level, some justify plea bar-
gaining simply because it saves prosecutorial and judicial
resources.0 Frank Easterbrook's more sophisticated account ar-
gues that the plea-bargaining system releases law enforcement
resources in a way that enables prosecutors to maximize deter-
rence, while at the same time being fair to defendants (i.e., be-
cause they benefit from bargains).5' A related, "contractarian"
theory suggests that the plea-bargaining system is sound, in a
utilitarian sense, because it both saves judicial resources and
makes all participants better off than they would be if they had
taken the risk of losing at trial.52
49. Cf John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13
L. & Soc'Y REV. 261, 262-65 (1979) (noting that the plea-bargaining system replaced
an efficient common law summary jury trial process).
50. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("Properly adminis-
tered, [plea bargaining] is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected
to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply
by many times the number of judges and court facilities."); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra
note 1, § 21.1, at 899 (citing an address by Chief Justice Burger in which he stated
that a guilty plea saves the judiciary manpower and resources); Bubany & Skillern,
supra note 1, at 483 ("LT]he primary justification for plea bargaining is system main-
tenance-the necessity of its use if most criminal offenders are to be processed.");
John S. Edwards, Professional Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor, 17 U. RICH.
L. REV. 511, 529 (1983) ("[P]lea bargaining is essential to conserve the time and re-
sources of the prosecutor and the courts . . . ."); Lynch, supra note 3, at 115 (noting
that "many have concluded that . . . without [plea bargaining], the courts would be
overwhelmed by a mass of trials they would be unable to handle"); Dominick R.
Vetri, Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 881-82 (1964) (identifying one of the goals of plea
bargaining as the preservation of judicial and prosecutorial resources).
51. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 308-10; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea
Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1974-78 (1992) (refining the theory);
Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 44-46 (analyzing and criticizing the Easterbrook theory).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A]
plea bargain itself is contractual in nature and 'subject to contract-law standards.'")
(citation omitted); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1966-68 (elaborating on contract
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Let us consider what assumptions the just result justifications
make about how the system will bring those results about. There
are two ways in which plea bargaining might approximate trials.
First, adversary bargaining might be expected to produce similar
results as adversary trials. Second, prosecutors might refuse to
agree to pleas that reflect anything other than likely trial results.
On the surface, it seems improbable that the first scenario
can hold true. As a process, plea bargaining lacks many of the
building blocks of adversarial theory, including the presence of
neutral and passive decision makers and rules that govern the
evidentiary and arbitration process." For a convergence to be
plausible, several premises need to be satisfied. The bargainers,
like trial lawyers, must be active and aggressive on behalf of
their clients.' They must have roughly equal access to resourc-
es and information.55 They must also respond to one another in
a fashion that in some way makes up for the absence of a judge
and jury.56 Perhaps most importantly, their goals-the desired
outcome-must be the same as at trial. For the most part, that
goal is to gain an advantage in the determination of legal, rather
than factual, guilt.57
theory); cf Church, supra note 2, at 513-15 (arguing that a contractual plea is valid
because it will, in practice, approximate the likely results of trial); Gifford, supra
note 35, at 38 (arguing that plea bargains are not viewed accurately as "consensual
agreements entered into by defendants after adversarial negotiations"); Lynch, supra
note 3, at 115 ("A second defense is that plea bargaining is . . . morally legitimate,
since both sides voluntarily engage in and benefit from the practice.").
53. See LANDSMAN, supra note 9, at 2-4 (discussing the adversary system's prem-
ise of a neutral and passive decision maker).
54. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 61 (discussing the nature of counsel required
by the adversary system).
55. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 33, at 518 (noting that the system cannot operate
as intended when the parties' resources are unequal); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of
the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 547 (noting the premise of the
adversary system that the parties should be "roughly equal in their ability to per-
form"); see also supra text accompanying note 22 (noting the varying assumptions dif-
ferent bargaining models make about the kind of information the parties must have).
56. Under the adversarial model, the presence of a neutral, passive arbiter of the
evidence provides the objectivity that counteracts, or draws the best from, the one-
sided nature of the adversaries' presentations. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 61-62
(explaining the building blocks of the adversary model).
57. The distinction between "factual" and "legal" innocence can be traced to Her-
bert Packer's seminal work, HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION (1968). Someone who is factually innocent did not commit the crime.
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Alternatively, one might replace the notion that adversarial
bargaining works like adversarial trial advocacy with a notion
that some independent feature of the bargaining system-most
likely, the actions of prosecutors-assures that results will be
similar. For this to hold true, one must believe that prosecutors
can accurately estimate the likelihood of conviction and will gear
plea offers exclusively to that factor.
One could interpret the trial approximation model in a more
systemic way. Rather than viewing individual plea bargains as a
"snapshot" of what would occur at trial, one could conceive the
corpus of plea bargains as producing a body of results that par-
allels trial results." In other words, bargained results approxi-
mate the average trial outcome for similar cases. At one level,
this interpretation is appealing because it helps explain how
bargaining reduces risk for the class of pleading defendants; if
bargains merely mirrored individual trials, then the outcome of
individual cases would remain unpredictable.
This approach has at least two difficulties. First, the moral jus-
tification for trials is that they produce good, or fair, results.59
Alternatively, litigation is justified on the basis that the sum of
all trials produces appropriate outcomes." Extending these justi-
Someone who is only legally innocent engaged in the offending facts, but is, should
be, or will be acquitted because evidence is suppressed or because of other deficien-
cies of proof. See id. at 167.
58. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 38, at 504 ("[A] proper goal of negotiation is to
produce a pattern of outcomes that reflects the would-be results of the controversies
were they formally litigated.").
59. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting
Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1030-31 (1967) (arguing that partisan. combat is the best
method for arriving at truth); John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in
Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 399-401 (1972) (concluding, based upon
empirical study, that adversarial trials moderate the effect of juries' biases). Of course,
many commentators dispute that the adversary system achieves "truth." See, e.g., Alan
Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 9, at 123, 126-33 (arguing that the
adversary system cannot be justified on the basis of truth, but can be justified as a
means of ensuring human dignity); Luban, supra note 9, at 91-93 (challenging the
standard justifications for the adversary system); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Cli-
ents, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647, 651-55 (1986) (arguing that
the adversary system is "misdescribed as a search for truth").
60. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 10.1, at 565-69
(1986) (discussing the contribution that an adversary presentation makes to a prop-
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fications to plea bargaining attehuates the logic. It is difficult to
imagine that a series of bargains that approximate trials by bal-
ancing faulty bargains in one direction against faulty bargains in
the opposite direction produces justice.6' Similarly, to the extent
that the systemic justification for litigation already assumes that
trials are a rough approximation for fair results, approximating
the approximation further dilutes the product. One could justify
the systemic result on an efficiency basis, 2 as under the
Easterbrook model discussed above," but efficiency is not the
main thrust of the trial approximation models.'
Second, if there is a moral justification for the systemic trial
approximation model, then it must be the notion that plea bar-
gains, on average, will produce similar results within a group of
similar cases, which will, in turn, moderate risk while maintain-
ing relatively fair outcomes for defendants. This is equivalent to
the theory that plea bargains equalize the treatment of similarly
situated defendants, a theory that this Article analyzes sepa-
rately.65 While acknowledging the possibility that the "snap-
shot" approach may be an oversimplification-or only one
view-of the trial approximation model, this Article treats it as
an independent theory.
As I have just suggested, the trial approximation rationale both
merges and diverges with the other prosecutor-oriented justifica-
tions for plea bargaining; namely, that prosecutors will produce
erly grounded decision, taking due account of all its faults); Fuller, supra note 9, at
45 (discussing the benefits of the adversary system).
61. Of course, to a limited extent, this is precisely the theory embraced by advocates
of the adversarial system who claim that the system, overall, produces fair results.
62. In other words, society should be concerned not with whether an individual plea
bargain achieves a trial-like outcome, but rather whether all plea bargains together
achieve what would be the average results for similar cases that are litigated. Under
this approach, prosecutors should not focus on individual defendants, their lawyers, or
the equities of any particular case. Rather, they should focus on whether the process
moves in a way that assures the result will contribute to an appropriate averaging. On
one view, the prosecutor might accomplish this by seeking to equalize results among
cases (as under the equality theory). On another, Easterbrook-like, view, she does the
job merely by assuring that prosecutors and defendants know about the bargain, which
in turn helps establish the "price" of similar crimes. See infra note 78.
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
64. Except, of course, to the extent that the theorists prefer bargained results to
the parallel trial results because they save resources.
65. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
19981 1141
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1121
equitable pleas in combined guilt/sentencing bargains and will
equalize results among similarly situated defendants or among
defendants unfairly penalized by rigid legislation. Both of the
latter justifications assume, probably correctly," that prosecu-
tors dominate the offer that is set on the table. However, they
make different assumptions about how prosecutors will act.
To produce equitable pleas, one must assume that prosecutors
have a standard, other than the likelihood of conviction, to
which they can refer in assessing each case.6" In offering a plea,
the prosecutor must look only to that fair result, rather than to
what benefits herself or her office. One must assume further
that the prosecutor will decide what form an offer will take
independently of tactical or resource factors (such as the quality
of the opposition).
If, however, equalizing results among defendants is the key to
plea bargaining, then different premises provide the foundation
for the system. Equalization must be important to the prosecu-
tor. For this to be true, prosecutors must consider legal inno-
cence at least as much as factual innocence. A guilty defendant
who is likely to be acquitted at trial arguably should receive the
same plea as one who is innocent and likely to be acquitted."
66. See generally Alschuler, supra note 1, at 65-100 (referring to a study by the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review tending to show control by prosecutors over
the choice of most pleas); Gifford, supra note 35, at 38 ("[The prosecutor substan-
tially dictates the terms of plea agreements in most cases.").
67. Far from identifying standards used by prosecutors, the available empirical
studies disagree even on whether prosecutors make plea-bargaining decisions based on
sympathy for the defendant. One study suggests that almost 27% of prosecutors rely
on sympathy as a determinant. See Vetri, supra note 50, at 901. Another argues that
"almost every prosecutor" considers this factor. Alschuler, supra note 1, at 59.
68. The notion of equality, of course, is malleable. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1437-39 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing various models of
equality); Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Pref-
erences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 191 (1992) ("'[Equality' itself
is an empty concept for purposes of normative criticism."); Peter Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982) (arguing that the idea of equality
"should be banished from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory norm"); see also
discussion infra notes 99, 110, 126 (discussing different conceptions of "equality"). Ar-
guably, for example, a prosecutor should compare the guilty defendant who will be
acquitted to equally guilty defendants who are convicted. Selecting a base of compari-
son reflects a normative choice that includes an evaluation of practical factors; for
example, the emphasis to be placed on obtaining some punishment, even if imperfect.
When one analyzes the notion of equalizing results among defendants in the context of
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Implicit in this rationale is the premise that the prosecutor can
obtain the information necessary to determine how the defen-
dant is situated, information that is often solely in the hands of
the defendant and his attorney.
The final just result theory supporting plea bargaining is sub-
stantially different in nature. It assumes that bargaining is good
as a process, because it includes and empowers the defendant in
making decisions that affect his life.69 The assumptions essen-
tial to this model have less to do with the numerical outcome of
bargaining than with its mechanics. The process must include
the defendant in a meaningful way. Defendants must receive
information necessary to make choices, be able to transmit infor-
mation that will be heard and taken seriously, and have some
meaningful influence over both the nature of the plea offer7"
and whether to accept it. 7
specific cases, one becomes increasingly aware that the theory itself requires definition in
order to be useful. Cf James S. Fishkin, Do We Need a Systematic Theory of Equal
Opportunity?, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 15, 15-17 (Norman E. Bowie, ed., 1988) (arguing the
impossibility of defining priority rules to define equality).
69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
70. That is not to say that the defendant must be able to require a lower plea
than the prosecutor is willing to offer, for that would undermine the whole notion of
bargaining. The key, however, is that the defendant must be able to have some in-
put, including pre-offer discussions over the range of punishment that is acceptable
to him and exploration of creative alternatives to pleas the prosecutor may offer,
such as diversion or restitution possibilities.
71. Technically, legal requirements assure that guilty pleas are "voluntary," in the
sense that the defendant understands the nature of the plea and freely gives up his right
to trial. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 745 (1970) (holding that a guilty
plea was not involuntary merely because it was prompted by the defendant's fear of the
death penalty); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1969) (holding that the
judge's failure to evaluate the voluntariness of a plea is grounds for automatic reversal).
This type of voluntariness is meaningless, however, if the defendant's choice to plead is
prompted by his belief that the alternative of trial, in reality, is unavailable-for exam-
ple, because the defense counsel's ineptness or unwillingness to spend the necessary time
on trial preparation eliminates the chance of acquittal. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3,
at 1200-03 (discussing the financial incentives to defense counsel to avoid trial); Brunk,
supra note 35, at 546 (arguing that a noncoercive plea process requires that there "be an
assurance of full due process at trial if the defendant refuses a bargain and opts for
trial"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 137, 142 (1986) (noting that counsel's failure to investigate may, real-
istically, undermine a defendant's ability to make an intelligent plea); cf Charles W.
Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507,
546 (1976) (arguing that, despite the voluntariness requirements, defendants still plead
guilty "without a full understanding of the bargain struck").
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Figure II summarizes some of the essential premises underly-
ing the just result justifications for plea bargaining.
FIGURE II - THE PREMISES UNDERLYING
THE JUST RESULT THEORIES
PLEA BARGAINS APPROXIMATE TRIALS
* P AND DEFENSE COUNSEL MUST BE ACTIVE AND AGGRESSIVE
* P AND D MUST HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO RESOURCES/INFORMATION
* P OR DEFENSE COUNSEL MUST HAVE OBJECTIVITY THAT
SUBSTITUTES FOR JUDGE AND JURY
U P MUST FOCUS ON D'S LEGAL INNOCENCE OR P MUST CONTROL THE
ULTIMATE OFFER
* P CAN AND WILL ESTIMATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION
* P MUST BASE OFFER PRIMARILY ON D's LEGAL INNOCENCE/GUILT
PLEA BARGAINING PRODUCES EQUITABLE RESULTS
U P CONTROLS THE ULTIMATE OFFER
* P MAINTAINS STANDARDS FOR WHAT CONSTITUTES FAIR RESULTS
* STANDARDS MUST NOT INCLUDE TACTICAL OR RESOURCE FACTORS
* P MUST BASE OFFER EXCLUSIVELY ON THE STANDARDS
PLEA BARGAINING EQUALIZES RESULTS FOR SIMILAR DEFENDANTS
* P CONTROLS THE ULTIMATE OFFER
* P CAN OBTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT D'S INNOCENCE/SITUATION
* P MUST FOCUS ON LEGAL INNOCENCE (PROSECUTORS THROUGHOUT
THE JURISDICTION MUST ACT SIMILARLY)
PLEA BARGAINING EMPOWERS DEFENDANTS
* D MUST RECEIVE INFORMATION
* D MUST BE ABLE TO TRANSMIT INFORMATION
* D MUST HAVE INPUT INTO PLEA OFFER
* D MUST CONTROL THE DECISION TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE PLEA
As Figure II illustrates, each of the just result theories focuses
primarily on the actions of the bargaining participants.
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The efficiency rationales, in contrast, rely more on basic as-
sumptions about the nature of the criminal justice system itself.
The argument that plea bargaining is inevitable is simply an
assertion, 72 probably unverifiable, 73  about the nature of the
system. Similarly, the proposition that bargaining saves resourc-
es makes only one assumption: a voluntary settlement costs less,
in time and resources, than a trial.74
The Easterbrook resource allocation theory, however, adds
significant premises. It assumes that the prosecutor can make an
assessment of how best to use trial resources and how best to
balance the certainty of pleas and the risk of losing at trial in
order to maximize overall deterrence.75 The theory then further
assumes that prosecutors will act on that basis when making plea
offers.76 Perhaps most significantly, recognizing that the crimi-
72. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 3, at 116 (noting the argument that "the abolition
of plea bargaining would be impossible because the parties would continue the prac-
tice even if higher authorities tried to curb itW); cf HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 157-
58 (pointing to the inevitability of some pretrial disposition processes).
73. One experiment and attempt to study the effects of banning plea bargaining
began in 1975 in Alaska. See NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING viii (1980). A report on that experiment found am-
biguous results regarding whether other mechanisms had substituted for bargaining.
See id. at 31. The overall rate of conviction and imprisonment seems to have in-
creased, but the frequency of disposition by plea remained fairly constant. See id. at
110, 112.
74. See Edwards, supra note 50, at 529 (approving plea bargains as avoiding the
costs and risks of litigation).
75. According to the Easterbrook theory, prosecutors set the price of crime by
deciding what combination of negotiated convictions and penalties will maximize
deterrence, while at the same time freeing up sufficient resources to allow further
prosecution (and trials) in other cases that will further enhance deterrence. See
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 309. Easterbrook assumes that prosecutors will not
prosecute defendants they know to be factually innocent, and that, in an ideal world,
innocent defendants generally will refuse to plead guilty. See Easterbrook, supra note
51, at 1969. For defendants who are factually guilty, but may be legally innocent,
the theory assumes that prosecutors have the information necessary to determine the
likelihood of acquittal and will make their plea offers so as to maximize deterrence.
See id. at 1970.
76. As Stephen Schulhofer effectively argues, the Easterbrook theory (and several
others) assume away the reality of agency costs. See Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 51.
Prosecutors have significant incentives to base plea offers on factors other than max-
imizing deterrence, including feathering their own reputations, personal workload
considerations, and their relations with the private bar. See id. at 50-51. The prob-
lem of agency costs and how prosecutors should reconcile them with their duty to do
justice in plea bargaining is explored in Part HI.H infra.
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nal justice system is about more than just maximizing resources,
Easterbrook's theory assumes that defendants, too, are better
served by a plea bargain." For this to hold true, the defendant's
lawyer must be in position to make a realistic assessment of the
chances of acquittal at trial and the likely sentence after convic-
tion, and must in fact make the decision of whether to accept an
offer in light of those considerations alone.7"
Robert Scott and William Stuntz's complex contract model is
similar.79 Rather than make assumptions about optimality of de-
terrence, Scott and Stuntz instead justify bargaining on the utili-
tarian principle that freedom to contract is a good thing. Voluntary
bargains tend to make both sides better off when resource consid-
erations and the risk of losing at trial are taken into account; pros-
ecutors obtain "a larger net return from criminal convictions...
[and] defendants, as a group, are able to reduce the risk of the im-
position of maximum sanctions.""0 Each party generally is in the
best position to assess their own utility and risk averseness. By
77. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 309 ("If defendants and prosecu-
tors . . . both gain, the process is desirable."). The notion that defendants are better
off with plea bargains than with the trial alternatives is an essential element of the
moral justification for Easterbrook's theory. Maximizing deterrence, alone, would not
suffice to justify plea bargaining because the benefits of deterrence might be out-
weighed by fairness costs to defendants. If defendants can be seen to benefit, howev-
er, then bargains make everyone better off. But cf Kipnis, supra note 3, at 556-57
(noting the public benefits of open jury trials).
78. Recognizing that some defendants will act more "ignorantly" than others,
Easterbrook rejects the argument that each individual counsel and defendant must
be informed and make intelligent decisions. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 309.
For him, the key is that the defense bar as a whole can assess the information
about "the going rate" that a series of plea bargains provides. Id. at 310. Neverthe-
less, to justify contractual arrangements between prosecution and defense,
Easterbrook needs to be able to conclude that both parties end up better off, be-
cause otherwise, "they would not strike the deals." Id.; see also Easterbrook, supra
note 51, at 1975 ("Settlements of civil cases make both sides better off; settlements
of criminal cases do so too."). For this premise to hold true, Easterbrook implicitly
must be assuming some level of informed and self-interested bargaining on the
defendants' behalf.
79. Scott and Stuntz are not the creators of the contract theory, but their recent
analysis and refinement of contract reasoning represents the best elaboration of the
theory. See generally Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1910-11 (arguing that the
norm of expanded choice justifies plea bargaining and that limitations on bargaining
autonomy should not apply in the plea-bargaining context).
80. Id. at 1915.
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definition, therefore, most bargains can be presumed to be good,
provided they are based on realistic assessments and not coerced.
As Scott and Stuntz recognize, their logic depends on several
structural assumptions. First, it assumes that plea bargains are
dickered or individualized, so that the participants in fact are
making meaningful choices and concessions about their prefer-
ences.8 Second, it assumes that counsel on both sides act aggres-
sively to further their side's actual interests, at least as aggres-
sively as they would act at trial.82 Deficiencies in representation
may arise simply from an advocate's lack of information'e or from
personal interests that conflict with the client's (i.e., agency
costs)."
81. See id. at 1922-23.
82. See generally id. at 1924 (arguing that, given the defendant's entitlement to a
trial, it is in the best interest of the prosecutor to bargain for a deal with each de-
fendant). Scott and Stuntz recognize that lawyers of differing quality may reach dif-
ferent results. A poor plea bargain negotiated by a bad lawyer, however, still may
benefit the client when it is compared to the likely result the defendant's bad law-
yer will achieve at trial. See id at 1922.
83. Scott and Stuntz focus on one class of information in which prosecutors rou-
tinely fail to obtain adequate information. They argue that the plea-bargaining pro-
cess encourages prosecutors to assume for purposes of plea bargaining that all defen-
dants are guilty. Structural aspects of the process prevent defense counsel from
being able to transmit the information establishing defendants' innocence. Scott and
Stuntz therefore stake out the position that innocent defendants who plead guilty to
avoid the risk of trial receive overly harsh plea offers. See id. at 1942-44.
84. See id at 1928. In other words, clients may not benefit even from a dickered
bargain when counsel negotiates to serve his own interests, such as avoiding trial
for financial or reputational reasons. Because most criminal defense lawyers are not
paid at an hourly rate by willing clients, their calculus of when going to trial is
beneficial may be significantly different than the calculus of lawyers in the civil
litigation context. Defense counsel agency costs are discussed in Part HI.F.2 infra.
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Figure III summarizes the premises underlying the efficiency
justifications.
FIGURE III - THE PREMISES UNDERLYING
THE EFFICIENCY THEORIES
PLEA BARGAINING IS INEVITABLE
PLEA BARGAINING SAVES PROSECUTORIAL AND JuDIcL
RESOURCES SETTLEMENT COSTS LESS THAN TRIAL
PLEA BARGAINING OPTIIZES DETERRENCE/IS FAIR TO THE D
" P CONTROLS THE ULTIMATE OFFER
" P HAS THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS D's LEGAL
INNOCENCE
" P CAN ASSESS THE OPTIMAL USE OF RESOURCES FOR
DETERRENCE
" P ACTS IN THE INTERESTS OF OPTIMIZING DETERRENCE
* DEFENSE COUNSEL REALISTICALLY ESTIMATES LIKELIHOOD
OF CONVICTION AND PROBABLE SENTENCE
" DEFENSE COUNSEL ACTS PRIMARILY8 5 ON THE BASIS OF THE
IEKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION AND PROBABLE SENTENCE
PLEA BARGAINING MAKES EVERYONE BETTER OFF
" PLEA OFFERS ARE INDIVIDUALIZED
* P AND DEFENSE COUNSEL BARGAIN AGGRESSIVELY
SPAND DEFENSE COUNSEL HAVE ADEQUATE INFORMATION
" P AND DEFENSE COUNSEL ACT ONLY IN THEIR CLIENTS'
INTERESTS
85. Easterbrook recognizes that sometimes defendants might act on the basis of
the potential costs of litigation, but suggests that ordinarily a defendant's self-inter-
est will depend on the likely results. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 297.
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Together with Figure II, it provides a reference point for evalu-
ating whether, in any given dase, the various justifications for
plea bargaining hold water. To the extent a justification is used
and its premises are not satisfied, the justification necessarily
fails unless the defect is counteracted through artificial means.
Arguably, a prosecutor who imposes or takes advantage of a plea
bargain when its justification is absent fails to serve justice.
IH. ANALYZING THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO BARGAIN JUSTLY
In critiquing the plea-bargaining system, scholars have noted
numerous scenarios or ways in which plea bargaining may pro-
duce undesirable results.s Some of these scenarios arise from
the possibility that prosecutors will offer pleas or take advan-
tage of a plea situation based on an unfair advantage;" for ex-
ample, situations in which prosecutors have information that is
unavailable to the defense. Alternatively, plea-bargaining quan-
daries may occur when prosecutors are tempted to pressure
defendants to take unfavorable pleas or to offer pleas that inade-
quately consider societal interests, perhaps for self-serving rea-
sons.s Finally, ethical issues may stem from defects in the
86. For the most comprehensive studies of questionable plea-bargaining scenarios
by one of plea bargaining's harshest and most erudite critics, see Alschuler, supra
note 1, and Alschuler, supra note 3. See also Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion:
An Overview, 13 AM. ClM. L. REV. 383, 426 (1976) (discussing coercive pleas);
Gifford, supra note 35, at 63 (noting scenarios involving agency costs, corruption,
racism, and other "invidious factors"); Green et al., supra note 1, at 503 (discussing
problems associated with inadequate counsel and irregularities in the process); Scott
& Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1947 (discussing unfair pleas offered to innocent defen-
dants willing to plead guilty).
87. See, e.g., McDonald et al., supra note 2, at 9 (discussing instances of improper
"bluffing" by prosecutors in cases in which the prosecutor had unique access to infor-
mation); Schulhofer, supra note 71, at 142-43 (noting the failure of defense counsel
toinvestigate adequately before plea); Ostrow, supra note 25, at 1608 (arguing that
most defendants' lack of information makes many guilty pleas nonconsensual).
88. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 1, at 62-64, 106-07 (discussing the prosecutor's
tendency to offer defendants excessive leniency or to pressure defendants to plead
guilty when the defendant is most likely to be innocent); Bruce A. Green, "Package"
Plea Bargaining and the Prosecutor's Duty of Good Faith, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 507,
514-16 (1989) (discussing scenarios involving related defendants in which prosecutors
may coerce pleas); Kipnis, supra note 3, at 556-57 (discussing forgotten benefits of
public trials); Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 49-60 (discussing agency costs and other
reasons why prosecutors may encourage inappropriate pleas).
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plea-bargaining process, as in the case of the prosecutor who
faces an ineffective adversary in negotiations. 9
Addressing all the individual scenarios, or even discussing
them grouped as above, risks creating an unhelpful laundry list of
problems. The following section therefore attempts to distill the
criticisms of plea bargaining into a series of dilemmas, punctuat-
ed by hypothetical examples, that delineate the issues of how
prosecutors should act when confronted by alleged flaws in the
process." Throughout the analysis, the answers necessarily de-
pend on how the prosecutor in question initially defines the func-
tion of pleas. The proof is in the pudding: applying different theo-
ries of plea bargaining produces different conceptions of justice.
In the following pages, I remit some hypotheticals and some
uncertain applications of the plea-bargaining theories to the
margins. The uncertainties reflect, in part, a subsidiary point
mentioned earlier.9 By applying the bargaining theories, one
can notice deficiencies or superficialities in the theories. The
goal of equalizing the treatment of defendants through plea
bargaining, for example, seems less workable when one tries to
identify to whom prosecutors should compare particular defen-
dants.9 2 The contract and Easterbrook models become problem-
atic when one analyzes the level of information participants to
the bargain are presumed to share.93 The exercise of working
through the plea-bargaining scenarios, therefore, may help us
identify weaknesses in and rethink the theories themselves.
89. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1205 (discussing reasons why defense
attorneys may act ineffectively in the plea context); Cox, supra note 86, at 428 (dis-
cussing the reality of ineffective defense counsel in plea bargaining); Goldstein, supra
note 35, at 701 (arguing that a prosecutor should have responsibilities to a defen-
dant beyond ensuring that his plea is technically voluntary); Green et al., supra note
1, at 507-08, 515-21 (discussing practice and case law governing inadequacy of coun-
sel in the plea context); Schulhofer, supra note 71, at 142 (arguing that plea bar-
gaining should be eliminated, in part because of inadequacy of defense counsel in
plea bargaining).
90. This Article does not address the related, but somewhat separate, issue of
whether prosecutors should be forbidden to "overcharge" as a method of coercing a
favorable plea. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 1, at 85-105 (discussing the practice of
overcharging).
91. See supra p. 1126.
92. See infra notes 99, 111, 126.
93. See supra notes 22, 23, 78; infra notes 105, 106, 112, 114.
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A. Confronting the Possibility That the Defendant is Factually
Innocent
One criticism that has been leveled at plea bargaining is that
the -bargaining system is deficient in identifying which defen-
dants are guilty of the crimes charged and that, as a result,
many innocent defendants plead guilty.' Of course, if a prose-
cutor knows that a defendant is factually innocent 95-- for exam-
ple, because another person has confessed to the crime-the
prosecutor must, under any theory, release the defendant."
Suppose, though, that a prosecutor truly believes that a de-
fendant has committed the crime charged, but has information
that may cast doubt on that conclusion. Suppose further that the
defense counsel does not have the information, so that one can-
not argue that an innocent defendant would be making a reason-
able, informed decision on whether the risks of conviction justify
pleading guilty. May the prosecutor nonetheless proceed to offer
and accept a plea?
Consider this realistic scenario:
A defense counsel fails to request discovery and potentially
exculpatory material. The prosecutor knows that under con-
stitutional or state law she would have to produce certain help-
ful material to the defense if the material were requested and
also knows that defense counsel is unaware of the material.
For purposes of discussion, let us assume that the law of discov-
ery does not take care of the problem by requiring the prosecu-
tor to disclose the information before accepting a plea.' Let us
94. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1278-80 (discussing the ethics of pleading
an innocent defendant guilty to avoid risk of trial); Kipnis, supra note 35, at 105
(arguing that the danger of convicting the innocent is greater in plea bargaining
than at trial); cf Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1985-86 (noting the need to minimize
convictions of innocent defendants).
95. In other words, the prosecutor knows that the defendant did not engage in
the criminal acts. See supra note 57.
96. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8(a) (1995) (for-
bidding the prosecutor to proceed in the absence of probable cause to believe the
defendant is guilty).
97. Courts are split on when prosecutors must disclose so-called Brady material.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text. At least some courts would not require
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also postpone the issue of how prosecutors should respond to
ineffective assistance of defense counsel. 8 The issue is whether
the prosecutor's sense that the defendant could be factually in-
nocent, even though the prosecutor does not believe he is, ethi-
cally requires the prosecutor to take steps to help the defendant
that she would not take in the absence of that sense.
If one justifies plea bargaining on the rationale that it enables
prosecutors to produce equitable results, then the defendant's
possible innocence is relevant. The prosecutor's appropriate reac-
tion, however, is not necessarily to reduce the plea offer based
on the lesser chance of conviction if the defendant were in-
formed. The theory assumes that the prosecutor controls the
offer. The prosecutor is to use an objective standard to decide
what would be fair for a guilty defendant who agrees to cooper-
ate. The key therefore is for the prosecutor to be as certain as
she can be that the defendant is guilty. She best accomplishes
this either by investigating further or by disclosing the helpful
information to defense counsel, so that counsel can investigate
and produce more information for the prosecutor to consider in
evaluating the equities.
The plea-bargaining justification that seeks to equalize the
treatment of similar defendants also would call for the prosecu-
tor to act, but in a different way. Under this theory, justice re-
quires the prosecutor to assure that this defendant receives an
offer and makes his decision to accept a plea based on the same
assessment of the risk of conviction, or chance of acquittal, as
other defendants whose lawyers obtain the helpful informa-
tion.99 The key is not the possible factual innocence of the de-
discovery pre-plea. See, e.g., United States v. Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. 1205, 1208-10
(W.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that the failure to disclose impeachment evidence is insuffi-
cient to taint plea). But cf. Ostrow, supra note 25, at 1583 (arguing for broad, man-
datory pre-plea discovery).
98. The problem of dealing with ineffective defense lawyers is discussed in detail
in Part III.E infra.
99. The equality theory often seems overly simplistic, in the sense that prosecu-
tors theoretically can compare the particular defendant to more than one other cate-
gory of defendant. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. This hypothetical sce-
nario, however, characterizes the defendant whose counsel fails to obtain the infor-
mation as aberrational. The fairest understanding of equality here is therefore that
this defendant should not simply be compared to other guilty defendants or to other
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fendant, but rather the possibility that the helpful information
would result in an acquittal or better bargain if defense counsel
were informed. The prosecutor can remedy the situation in one
of two ways: she can reveal the information, or she can reduce
the plea offer to approximate the result that other informed
defendants would accept. She may not, however, ignore the fact
that other defendants in the same situation would probably end
up in a better position.
Several of the other plea-bargaining models, however, justify
proceeding on the belief that the defendant is guilty and encour-
aging a plea to the maximum. For example, the existence of
helpful information is irrelevant to the rationales that approve
bargains simply because they are inevitable,00 save resources,
empower defendants, or limit the effect of rigid legislation.
These theories suggest that any bargain in our scenarios-at
least ones in which defendants participate'° 1 -would advance
the reasons supporting pleas.
Consider, next, the notion that plea bargaining is appropriate
because it approximates the results of trials. Defense counsel's
error presumably would continue through trial and would affect
the likely result at trial.' 2 Whether the theory assumes that
the prosecutor should gauge the likelihood of conviction or as-
sumes that the bargaining process parallels trial, it must recog-
nize that defense counsel's error would influence the verdict.
Arguably, the plea offer therefore may be adjusted to take ad-
vantage of the error. The prosecutor would be justified in pro-
defendants whose counsel act negligently.
100. The plea-bargaining theory which justifies bargaining simply because of its "in-
evitability" is a tautology. Presumably, under that theory, a prosecutor is always justi-
fied in plea bargaining, in any way, unless it can be shown that the result would be
unlawful if plea bargaining were not allowed. To avoid repetition, I will not analyze
what constitutes justice under this theory in each of the following scenarios.
101. The element of personal participation by the defendant is essential only under
the empowerment theory. The other justifications largely assume that defendants'
interests are adequately protected by having active and informed defense counsel.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 54 (noting the need for active and aggressive
bargaining on behalf of clients under the trial approximation theory).
102. In a few cases, of course, defense counsel may concentrate more and work
harder as a case gets closer to trial. These lawyers may correct their earlier over-
sight. As a general matter, however, defense counsel who are too sloppy to make a
routine discovery request are unlikely to identify their mistakes in time to correct it.
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ceeding with the plea.' °3
The contract and Easterbrook models lead to a similar analy-
sis. The models assume that both prosecution and defense are
better off bargaining than going to trial, once the risks of convic-
tion are taken into account.'" When the gap in the defendant's
information will continue through trial, the prosecutor's high
plea offer and defense counsel's uninformed decision to accept or
reject the offer is a realistic assessment of the likelihood of con-
viction."5 Under the contract theory, the parties can determine
whether an agreement puts them both in an improved situation
and can dicker for a mutually beneficial result.0 6  In
103. Consider this variation on the scenario:
Prosecutor has truly exculpatory Brady material which she will eventual-
ly need to disclose, but not until after a plea would be consummated.
Here, timing of the plea is of the essence; constitutional requirements require a
prosecutor to disclose some categories of exculpatory information in time to assist
the defendant at trial. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (requir-
ing disclosure, even in the absence of a request by defense counsel, when the excul-
patory material creates a reasonable doubt); cf State v. Martin, 495 A.2d 1028, 1033
(Conn. 1985) (entitling the prosecutor to withhold disclosure of possibly exculpatory
material until trial). Under the trial approximation theory, the system would not be
working in its anticipated fashion if the prosecutor obtains a plea agreement based
on a probability of conviction that is much higher than reality. To achieve a just
plea, in these terms, the prosecutor either must adjust the offer downwards or must
give defense counsel the information necessary for him to make an accurate assess-
ment of the likely results at trial.
104. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
105. In other words, defense counsel is correctly gauging the likelihood of conviction
in a trial in which defense counsel does not have the information.
106. When defense counsel misgauges the likelihood of conviction because of a tem-
porary information gap, however, as in the scenario presented in note 102 supra,
even aggressive bargaining by defense counsel will not serve his client's interest.
From a contract perspective, counsel does not have adequate information to evaluate
the fairness of the bargain. Similarly, Easterbrook's approach suggests that the deci-
sion to accept the plea would not be a realistic assessment of the case. Under either
theory, the prosecutor probably should make sure that counsel is informed adequate-
ly before she can assume that a negotiated plea is just.
A prosecutor might rationalize withholding the information on the theory that
defense counsel, in assessing the likelihood of conviction, already considers the possi-
bility that circumstances may change. For example, counsel is aware that there is
always the possibility that he could discover a new, helpful witness before trial. The
chances of such a change are greater the earlier the parties enter the plea. Yet, under
the contract theory, there is a qualitative difference between both sides dealing with
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Easterbrook's terms, the prosecutor maximizes deterrence by
obtaining the highest possible plea agreement from a given com-
mitment of resources.'
0 7
B. Confronting the Possibility That the Defendant Might Be
Acquitted for Reasons Unrelated to Guilt
The previous scenario involved the- prosecutor's recognition of
the possibility that the defendant might be factually innocent.
What if, however, the prosecutor is convinced of the defendant's
factual guilt, but has sole possession of information that sug-
gests that the defendant might be acquitted at trial?
Consider this situation:
The prosecutor has nondiscoverable information that his
truthful key witness is unwilling to cooperate. The prosecutor
knows the information would affect the defendant's willing-
ness to plead guilty.
May the prosecutor encourage an unwitting plea?'0 8 Converse-
ly, would it be appropriate for the prosecutor to act leniently to-
ward the guilty defendant-even dismiss the case-simply be-
cause of tactical considerations?0 9
If the justification for plea bargaining is that its results paral-
lel the results at trial, then the prosecutor clearly may not take
advantage of the situation. She needs to dismiss the case, or at
least offer a plea sufficiently reduced to reflect the defendant's
unforeseen risks and only one side being in a position to make a realistic assessment.
In some respects, the difference may mirror the difference between contract laws
mistake and unconscionability doctrines, in which the inequality of bargaining posi-
tions may affect both the validity of the bargain and the remedy when circumstances
change. See CALAMARI & PERMLO, supra note 23, § 9-38; cf Scott & Stuntz, supra
note 2, at 1954 (analogizing contract and plea-bargain settings and referring to con-
tract doctrines in proposing a remedy for pleas by innocent defendants).
107. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 295-96.
108. In his study of prosecutors, Professor Alschuler discussed a related example of
the prosecutor who learns that his witness has disappeared. See Alschuler, supra
note 1, at 67. In the actual case, the prosecutor attempted to bluff the defendant
into pleading guilty. See id.
109. Cf id. at 59-60 (illustrating, empirically, that prosecutors tend to offer exces-
sive leniency in order to avoid risking a loss at trial).
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actual risk of conviction."0
Other plea-bargaining rationales justify the opposite extreme
of prosecutorial conduct; that is, acting as if the witness still will
testify. For example, to the extent equitable results drive justice
in plea bargaining, the prosecutor presumably should ignore
tactical considerations and follow prosecution standards for what
result is fair for persons like the defendant who have committed
the crime and are willing to accept responsibility. Similarly,
under an empowerment theory, the key is whether the defen-
dant is able to participate in the bargaining. That consideration
has nothing to do with whether the resulting bargain is benefi-
cial for the defendant."'
The analysis is more complicated under the efficiency ratio-
nales. Consider the most simplistic of these theories-that plea
bargaining saves prosecutorial and judicial resources. This theo-
ry suggests that any bargain is preferable to a trial. Here, how-
ever, the alternative may not be trial, but dismissal. When re-
110. As discussed previously, if one conceives the trial approximation theory as
looking at the average result produced by similar cases, the prosecutor's reactions
arguably should be different. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. She would
be more free to take into account factors that have nothing to do with whether this
defendant is likely to win-factors such as the brutality of the crime and the
defendant's criminal history. Viewed this way, however, the theory merges and, in-
deed, becomes the equalization theory of plea bargaining. See infra note 111.
111. Analyzing our scenario under the equality model illustrates a significant weak-
ness of the model itself. There are several persons against whom this defendant
might be compared: an equally guilty defendant who is not lucky enough to face an
unwilling witness; an equally guilty defendant who is lucky enough to go to trial
and wins because the witness is absent; an equally guilty defendant who goes to
trial and faces a compelled but uncooperative witness; and an equally guilty defen-
dant who pleads to a lesser offense because his lawyer learns of the witness's
incalcitrance. Cf LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 21.1, at 898-903 (discussing the
issue of how much leniency pleading defendants should receive).
The model seems to presume that prosecutors will focus on legal, as well as
factual, innocence. On the one hand, defendants with the information would be ac-
quitted, so defendants without it should be treated similarly in the plea process. On
the other hand, less fortunate defendants who are no more culpable than the defen-
dant are subject to the full penalty. Unless the model is refined in a way that
clearly identifies what factors are to be considered, it loses all but hortatory mean-
ing. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 302-04 (criticizing the equality argument and
concluding that "[ilf equality means that every criminal receives the same desert,
then equal treatment could be achieved only by eliminating every source of variance,
from differential likelihoods of arrest to the disparate paroling and pardoning policies
of postconviction officials").
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sources are the sole issue, the prosecutor presumably must as-
sess whether she could proceed without the witness. If so, she
may bargain aggressively. If not, dismissal is the most efficient
use of resources and therefore the just result.
The Easterbrook and contract models differ in that they in-
clude both a measure of what benefits the prosecution and a
notion of what benefits, or is fair to, the defendant."2 The first
112. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing the Easterbrook model);
supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing the contract model). Under the con-
tract approach, this occurs only when defense counsel bargains aggressively, based
on full, or fully accessible, information. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
The assumption of full information may require distinctions under the contract mod-
el that are not necessary under other theories that simply require the defendant,
factually, to be better off. See generally supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text
(discussing premises of the equity and equalization theories).
Consider these slight variations on the hypothetical. First, imagine that the key
prosecution witness is not simply noncooperative, but has died. See, e.g., People v.
Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41, 43-45 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that the prosecution was not
obliged to disclose the death of a witness before accepting a plea). Second, assume
that the witness is still alive and cooperative, but the prosecutor now believes the
witness has lied and does not plan on putting him on the stand. Cf United States
v. Olachea-Jimenes, No. 95-55132, 1996 WL 285707 (9th Cir. May 29, 1996) (declin-
ing to rescind a plea after the defendant learned about the deportation of the
government's confidential informant). This will weaken, but not eliminate, the
prosecution's case.
In the world of limited criminal discovery, secrets are common. Few jurisdictions
authorize depositions and interrogatories. Beyond specific items prescribed by statute,
prosecutors and defendants need not disclose their theories of the case nor the sub-
stance of their potential witness's testimony. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (providing for
and limiting discovery in criminal cases); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 20.2-3,
at 844-58 (describing discoverable items). Both prosecution and defense must prepare
for trial with only general knowledge, sometimes merely suspicion, of the other side's
approach.
Thus, even a contract model of plea bargaining cannot assume that both sides
have full information. See generally CODDINGTON, supra note 22 (prescribing a math-
ematical model to account for changes in information and expectations as bargaining
progresses); Schweizer, supra note 22, at 164 (arguing that the assumption of ratio-
nal actors implies that parties will react according to their perception of what infor-
mation the other side may have); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1940-49 (describ-
ing bargaining as the process through which parties take advantage of, and some-
times trade, information uniquely available to them). At best, it may contemplate
simply "adequate information" or "equal access" to information, rather than making
the counterfactual assumption that each side in a plea bargain knows everything.
This is consistent with civil contract theory, which recognizes that one party often
has superior information. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153-54
(1981) (presuming that a unilateral information mistake by a party to a contract
ordinarily will not suffice to void a contract). Traditional contract doctrines that re-
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consideration approves of the maximum obtainable plea for
factually guilty defendants. The second consideration suggests
that pleas are not just when, taking due account of the risks of
trial, defendants make clearly incorrect choices.1
3
Simply reducing the plea offer cannot satisfy justice. The es-
sence of both the Easterbrook and contract models is that the
parties themselves are best able to identify and protect their
own interests."' Disclosure seems the only option if these
act to informational imbalances-the mutual mistake and unconscionability doc-
trines-are limited in scope. See supra note 23; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Mis-
take, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-9
(1978), reprinted in ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF CONTRACT LAW 114, 116 (1979) (discussing when informational mistake or nondis-
closure by one party to a contract might necessitate relief from the contract).
In the deceased witness scenario, both sides have access to the fact of death.
The contract model thus might allow the prosecutor to take advantage of this limit-
ed informational advantage. In the noncooperative witness scenario, however, the
information is uniquely in the prosecutor's possession. Without this information, the
defendant cannot accurately gauge the risks of going to trial. Arguably, the contract
model would require the prosecutor to disclose such critical information.
113. Easterbrook, for example, assumes that the prosecutor will maximize deter-
rence from her available resources. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 295-96. That is
a net plus for society so long as the defendant receives some benefit. Similarly, the
contract model assumes that both sides end up better off. See supra text accompany-
ing note 19. The safeguards to ensure the benefit to the defendant are that defense
counsel realistically estimates the likely result and promotes the plea solely on the
basis of that estimate. Yet, in the absence of some action by the prosecutor,
counsel's estimate here will be wildly inaccurate.
An unwise choice can still be a correct one, within limits. Easterbrook assumes
there is a range of plea results that will benefit a defendant when compared with
the risk of trial, and that the defendant is better off as long as he ends up with a
lower sentence than the maximum plea he would accept. See Easterbrook, supra
note 2, at 297. Mistakes by defense counsel may result in pleas that are high within
this range yet still leave the defendant better off. However, a plea that is not rooted
in the reality of the defendant's interests-for example, a plea to the maximum pen-
alty that the defendant could receive after trial-would not be in the defendant's
interests and therefore cannot be deemed to be one that fits the model of decision
makers who Easterbrook assumes fill the system.
114. One's view of the prosecutor's responsibilities may be affected by the timing of
the undisclosed event and the plea. If the prosecutor offers the bargain immediately
after learning, say, of a witness's death, one might be unable to conclude that the
defendant has equal access to the information. Cf Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse &
Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507, 512-13 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (setting aside a civil set-
tlement because the attorney failed to disclose the plaintiffs death during a three-week
period between mediation and agreement to settlement). Yet, if significant time has
elapsed, defense counsel can more easily be blamed for failing to learn the information.
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theories are to work."'
C. Confronting Inequality in the Treatment of Defendants
We have already noted that one justification for plea bargain-
ing is that bargaining enables prosecutors to equalize treatment
among similarly situated defendants."' But let us assume,
probably accurately, that many prosecutors do not see equaliza-
tion as their primary charge. Under the other theories of plea
bargaining, should a prosecutor nonetheless take into account
that a maximum plea offer, if accepted, will result in a guilty
defendant receiving worse treatment than other equally guilty
defendants?" 7
Consider this case:
A prosecutor knows that his office has adopted a new, unpub-
lished policy of not taking cases to trial in which spousal
abuse is not confirmed by medical evidence-such as those in
which the wife has complained after her injuries have disap-
peared. Defense counsel does not know of the policy.
Should the prosecutor quickly offer and accept the maximum
plea she can obtain?
What makes this case different from some of the others dis-
cussed is that the prosecutor's choices here are between accept-
ing a plea from a presumably guilty defendant and living with a
Alternatively, the key may be whether the deceased witness is peculiarly within
the prosecutor's control; for example, a police officer. In contrast, if the witness is a rel-
ative of the defendant, one might well argue that the prosecutor's informational advan-
tage simply reflects better preparation than the defense-a reality that mdy exist with
respect to many plea bargains.
115. In the civil context, lawyers ordinarily would not consider disclosing items not
legally required to be disclosed. Some courts, however, have challenged this vision of
lawyering. In Virzi, for example, the court set aside a settlement because of one
attorney's violation of his alleged "ethical obligation" to disclose the death of his cli-
ent before finalizing the settlement. Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 512; cf Southern Trench-
ing, Inc. v. Diago, 600 So. 2d .1166, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing a jury
verdict because of an attorney's failure to disclose his client's separate accident, prior
to trial, involving the same injuries at issue).
116. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
117. One such scenario was discussed earlier.- the prosecutor's key witness is recal-
citrant or has died unbeknownst to the defendant. See supra note 112.
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nolle prosequi. In addition, there are two classes against which
the prosecutor reasonably might compare this defendant: other
equally guilty defendants who are released under the policy and
other equally guilty defendants who plead or are convicted be-
cause the policy does not apply.
The concept of equal treatment seems irrelevant to several of
the plea-bargaining models-most notably, the empowerment
theory and the inevitability theory."' But evaluating the rele-
vance of the policy under the other plea-bargaining rationales
requires more analysis."' Consider, for example, the rationale
that bargains reflect what would happen at trial. In our scenar-
io, there would in actuality be no trial. If, however, there were a
trial, then there would be a possibility of conviction. Which
eventuality should control the bargain?
The basis of the theory is that the trial process, with its
protections of judge and jury, would produce an appropriate re-
sult and that a plea bargain that tracks that result also is ap-
propriate. The fact that the prosecution's office might release a
defendant for independent reasons does not affect that calculus.
Presumably, the measure of fairness is what would happen if
the defendant went on to trial. Thus, in our scenario, the prosecu-
tor reasonably could proceed with the plea despite the office policy.
By contrast, the reality that no trial would occur seems criti-
cal to the theory that plea bargains which save resources are, by
definition, appropriate. If the alternative to the bargain is dis-
missal, fewer resources would be devoted to the case if the pros-
118. Under the empowerment theory, the key is not the ultimate result of the plea
bargain, but rather whether this defendant participated fully in the process. See su-
pra text accompanying notes 69-71. Even an unfavorable result may satisfy the em-
powerment theory. The inevitability theory goes even further. It approves virtually
all plea bargains, regardless of their fairness. See supra text accompanying note 49.
119. Under the equity theory, the result depends upon the reason for the dismissal
policy. If the policy itself stems from equitable factors-including the likelihood that
claimed abuse probably did not occur in the absence of medical evidence-then pre-
sumably it is an objective, equitable prosecution standard that the prosecutor should
honor in the plea process; she should dismiss the case. If, however, the policy de-
rives from resource considerations (i.e., that it is difficult to prove abuse in the ab-
sence of medical evidence), the policy should not drive the bargain. The equity theo-
ry presumes that the prosecutor will base her offers on standards, unrelated to tacti-
cal considerations, that define fair results for people with the defendant's background
who have committed this kind of crime. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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ecutor declines to offer a plea (or, in this case, accomplishes the
equivalent through a dismissal at the plea-bargaining stage).2 '
D. Responding to "Equitable" Arguments
Let us assume that defense counsel presents the prosecutor
with arguments for a lesser plea based on purely equitable fac-
tors that are not routinely part of the prosecutor's criteria:
"Defendant's mother is dying and she needs his support"; "De-
fendant is a good, church-going boy"; "He'll lose his job if he goes
to jail"; "Under a three-strikes law, he'll get life imprisonment
for stealing a loaf of bread." As we have seen, one justification
for plea bargaining is, precisely, that it enables prosecutors to
take such equitable factors into account,'" according to
preformulated prosecution standards.' But how should such
considerations contribute to prosecutorial decisions under the
120. The answer is less clear under the Easterbrook model and contract models,
which require that everyone be in a better position with a plea instead of a trial.
See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 309. Easterbrook accepts that differences in quali-
ty exist among defense attorneys and that sometimes "ignorant" defendants are
disserved. Id. at 308-10. At the same time, like the contract model, the Easterbrook
theory equates plea bargaining with an ordinary market, in which both parties im-
prove their position by contracting. See id. at 289, 308-09.
The issue in the hypothetical is what information defense counsel needs in or-
der to evaluate realistically his client's choices and preferences; the client might pre-
fer a plea to trial, but clearly would prefer a dismissal to a plea. In an ordinary
civil contract situation, preferences often change over time as information becomes
available. Arguably, a plea is appropriate in the hypothetical until the option of dis-
missal becomes apparent. Yet, one could take the equally reasonable position that
the prosecutor cannot gain a unilateral bargaining advantage from information that
is unavailable to defense counsel.
The terms of the contract and Easterbrook theories do not resolve the dilemma.
Indeed, the theories' presumption that defendants will have "adequate information"
in effect restates the issue. Nevertheless, if the theories truly contemplate that de-
fendants receive some benefit from a plea bargain agreement, as compared against a
decision not to plead, then that alone should preclude a bargain.
One additional caveat is necessary in applying the Easterbrook theory.
Easterbrookls key premise is that prosecutorial decisions are made in the interests of
optimizing deterrence. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 292, 295-96. Presumably,
relying on the hypothetical office policy is consistent with that premise because the
policy itself makes a resource decision regarding when it is cost efficient to prose-
cute alleged abusers. To the extent the policy relies on other considerations, it is
less valid as a basis for plea bargain decision making.
121. See supra text accompanying note 39.
122. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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other justifications for plea bargaining?
The equitable factors may be relevant to sentencing, but they
are largely irrelevant at the trial stage." This discussion thus
is limited to the prosecution's decision to offer a plea to a higher
or lower offense, rather than to the prosecutor's position at sen-
tencing once a conviction is finalized."
A prosecutor whose goal is to approximate trial results should
not take equitable factors into account unless they would affect
the trial as well. Similarly, the prosecutor who seeks to use
guilty pleas to equalize results among similarly situated defen-
dants should take the factors into account only if other defen-
dants, including those who go to trial, would benefit. In reality,
these other defendants might benefit, but probably only at the
sentencing stage. Hence, the prosecutor probably should not
adjust the level of the plea-i.e., the offense for which the defen-
dant agrees to accept conviction-though the prosecutor might
well take a lenient position on sentencing in the same way she
might take a lenient position after trial."
The equitable factors are similarly irrelevant to most of the
other justifications for plea bargaining. The empowerment theo-
ry, for example, looks solely to the defendant's ability to partici-
pate in the bargain, which is unaffected by the equitable factors.
The factors also have no impact on the efficiency of a plea bar-
gain, except to the extent that, under the Easterbrook rationale,
the prosecutor determines that a lesser plea is appropriate as a
123. Of course, if the trial court admits the information, it may produce sympathy
for the defendant and help him gain an acquittal. In the abstract, however, the
sympathy factors typically are unrelated to the crime itself and to whether defen-
dant committed it.
124. For ease of analysis, this Article has separated sentencing from conviction. In
reality, of course, some pleas encompass a bargain both over the conviction and the
potential sentence. Under the plea-bargaining theories, most situations in which sen-
tences are discussed can be analyzed in the same way as those in which the issue
simply is plea or trial. Some of the theories may have to be adjusted slightly to
require the prosecutor to focus not only on the defendant's factual or legal guilt, but
also on the sentence that this defendant (or similar defendants) would be likely to
receive after trial.
125. In other words, if the plea encompasses both conviction and sentence, the
prosecutor's function under the trial approximation theory is to take equitable factors
into account only in a way that mirrors their likely effect on the result in a trial
process.
1162
1998] JUSTICE IN PLEA BARGAINING 1163
matter of deterrence policy. Nothing, however, obliges a prosecu-
tor to conclude that a lesser plea is necessary to optimize re-
source allocation. From the defendant's perspective, he and his
counsel are equipped with the information and resources neces-
sary to decide whether agreeing to a plea is beneficial.
These conclusions are not as surprising as they seem. For
they do not necessarily mean that equitable factors are irrele-
vant to prosecutorial decisions regarding the justness of pleas.
They do signify, however, that these factors are irrelevant unless
the equity theory of prosecution-reducing plea offers to account
for equitable factors or rigid legislative punishment schemes-is
deemed to be all, or a significant part, of the prosecutor's func-
tion. If the equity theory is to play a role, then presumably pros-
ecution offices need to spell out which factors should contribute
to prosecutorial decisions and how. In contrast, if a pure efficien-
cy, contract, or empowerment theory is deemed to drive plea
bargaining, prosecutors should not take equitable factors into
account.'26
126. The earlier analysis assumed that equalizing treatment among similarly situ-
ated guilty defendants depends upon the prosecutor determining whether the defen-
dant would be convicted at trial and then using equitable factors at sentencing in
the same way as at post-trial sentencing. Sometimes, however, a rigid sentencing
scheme can render that procedure unworkable as, for example, when a three-strikes
law forbids leniency for someone who committed two previous crimes many years
ago.
Under one approach, this dilemma can simply be resolved according to the
above analysis. The prosecutor should ignore the "equities" unless she assumes, or
her office assigns her, an equitable function in plea bargaining, or unless a lesser
plea would further a rational deterrence policy.
But assume that, under the prosecutor's routine approach, equitable factors are
irrelevant except when necessary to equalize treatment among similarly situated
defendants. Compared to other defendants with two strikes, a plea only to a felony
seems appropriate. At the same time, however, the stale nature of the prior convic-
tions makes the hypothetical defendant look more like guilty defendants who have
no prior convictions. The prosecutor thus may feel a need to compensate for the
mandatory sentencing scheme.
As in other arenas, the notion of equality here is not susceptible to easy defini-
tion. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 107, 148-56 (1976) (discussing equality in terms of group discrimination);
Christopher Jencks, What Must Be Equal for Opportunity to Be Equal, in EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY, supra note 68, at 47, 72 (describing difficulty in defining what "equal
opportunity" might mean); Westen, supra note 68, at 559-92 (discussing fallacious
"equality" reasoning); id. at 558 n.69 (citing authorities examining the relationship
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E. Reacting to Ineffective Defense Representation
Elsewhere, I have written about the responsibilities of prose-
cutors who know or learn that defense counsel is acting ineffec-
tively at the trial stage.'27 Those responsibilities, and the ap-
propriate action when the responsibilities come into play, turn
largely on elements of the adversarial process that are not pres-
ent in the plea-bargaining process."
A prosecutor might confront several categories of ineffective-
ness at the plea bargaining stage. A defense counsel may act
ineffectively in the plea-bargaining process itself. In other cases,
prosecutors can foresee that defense counsel will be ineffective
at a later stage. Finally, a prosecutor sometimes faces an ex-
traordinarily poor lawyer whose conduct may not fall to the min-
imal level of ineffectiveness against which constitutional law
protects. Although recognizing that the defendant may not have
a legal claim to undo the conviction after-the-fact, the prosecutor
may still feel a moral inclination to act ex ante.
between the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause); see also supra note 99 and authorities cited supra note
11L More to the point, the prosecutor will not be able to choose between the horns
of her dilemma in any rational way unless the definition of her "equalizing"
role-found in internal prosecution guidelines, supervisory controls, or the
prosecutor's personal conception of her role-includes some direction or criteria re-
garding the proper basis of comparison.
127. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 66-73.
128. My thesis in the trial context was that the prosecutor's obligation to do justice
requires her to assure that the premises of the adversarial model are satisfied in a
particular case. See id. at 49. To the extent the premise of equal adversariness fails,
what the prosecutor must do depends on whether the court is in an equally good
position to observe and remedy defense counsel's inadequacies. See id. at 69. Because
negotiations occur-and are designed to occur-largely outside of the court's super-
vision, that theory cannot apply equally to plea bargaining. Cf Flowers, supra note
8, at 939 (arguing that adversarial theory has no application to prosecutorial investi-
gative activity occuring before a suspect is charged, because the "basic elements of
the adversary process are simply not present").
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1. Ineffective Assistance in Plea Bargaining
Defense lawyers act ineffectively in plea bargaining in twoprimary ways.' First, they may fail to pursue information that
they need to maximize their clients' position:
The prosecutor knows that the defense counsel often acts in-
effectively in pretrial representation by failing to conduct any
investigation and failing to request discovery and exculpatory
material. The prosecutor also knows that, ordinarily, he
would have to produce certain helpful material to the de-
fense, but that in this case defense counsel is unaware of the
material.
Second, defense lawyers simply may make extraordinarily poor
choices for their clients. For example:
The prosecutor knows that the defense counsel has a track
record of being so burnt-out, or so afraid of trying cases, that
the defense counsel routinely accepts whatever bargain a
prosecutor offers.'
Should the prosecutor react, and how?
Both the equity and equalizing-among-defendants models of
plea bargaining assume that prosecutors control pleas and will
make their offers based on nontactical factors. The prosecutors'
decision in our scenarios should not turn on how much they can
get from the defendant, but rather on what plea is fair, accord-
ing to the prosecution's standards, or on what other similar de-
fendants would receive. Hence, under these two theories, the
prosecutor should offer only that plea that she would be willing
to offer a well-represented defendant.
129. A third category of ineffectiveness in plea bargaining exists; namely, failing to
file motions or to place pressure on the prosecutor to obtain a better plea. Depend-
ing on the reasons for counsel's conduct, the issues arising from such ineffectiveness
can be analyzed either under the rubric of the counsel who makes bad choices for
the client, see supra note 113 and accompanying text, or under the rubric of counsel
who succumbs to personal considerations (i.e., agency costs). See infra Part m.F.2.
130. Professor Alschuler discussed this scenario at length in Alschuler, supra note
3, at 1182-206. He concluded that as many as 50% of all paid defense attorneys
may fit this model. See d. at 1185.
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In contrast, the empowerment model focuses on the
defendant's ability to participate meaningfully in the bargaining
process. When missing information or counsel's passivity affect
the defendant's ability to receive and process his choices, an ap-
propriate plea bargain will not result absent some corrective
action. The prosecutor cannot remedy the situation simply by
adjusting the plea offer, for it is the defendant's participation
that is key. The appropriate choice among the alternative reme-
dies, discussed in the margin, is fact sensitive. 3'
Under a trial-approximation theory, the two types of ineffec-
tiveness need to be analyzed separately. Defense counsel's lazi-
ness in seeking favorable information might well continue
through trial. Some information, however, comes to defense
131. Whether disclosing the missing information can compensate for defense
counsel's laziness depends, in part, on whether counsel will relay the information to
the defendant and help the defendant analyze and make use of it. When his counsel
simply leaves the defendant on his own, as in the second hypothetical, the defendant
does not receive a meaningful opportunity to have input. Two problems confront the
prosecutor: she cannot know what has transpired between the defendant and his
counsel, and she cannot communicate with the defendant directly to receive or trans-
mit information. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1995)
(forbidding lawyers to contact represented parties); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSBILrrY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1981) (same); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (applying Rule 4.2 to prosecu-
tors even at the preindictment stage); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the
Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, Or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to
Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 445 n.64 (1996) (relating varying results reached by
courts concerning no-contact rules).
The prosecutor must evaluate all of the evidence she can obtain regarding de-
fense counsel's conduct. If, after disclosure, the prosecutor believes that the defen-
dant is now able to participate in the process, then the prosecutor may proceed with
a plea. If, however, the prosecutor continues to sense a problem, or if defense coun-
sel continues to act passively, then the prosecutor should take the only available
step: she should discuss the matter with defense counsel. Barring a transformation
or an acceptable explanation, the prosecutor should not accept any plea until a judge
can be advised and corrective action can be taken. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at
72 (arguing that in certain trial contexts prosecutors must inform the court of de-
fense counsel's ineffectiveness).
As a practical matter, prosecutors may not be able to encourage judicial in-
volvement immediately because, typically, judges are not involved heavily in the case
during the negotiating stages. After the arraignment and preliminary hearing, the
judge may not even see the parties until the trial date. Once the court becomes an
active participant, however, the judge is in a position to speak directly with the de-
fendant and, if necessary, to replace (at least) appointed counsel. See id. at 73; infra
note 156.
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attorneys in a self-executing manner. For example, some catego-
ries of Brady material 32 and information from witnesses who
appear at trial, but whom counsel does not interview before-
hand, will be exposed to the defense through the trial
process.'33 Whether defense counsel would have particular in-
formation at trial depends on the nature of the information in
question.
The trial-approximation theory suggests that the hypothetical
prosecutor acts reasonably in proceeding with the plea when
defense counsel is unlikely to learn the information through the
trial process. If counsel would learn the information and the
information is significant enough to affect the trial, then an
approximation can be achieved in one of two ways. The prosecu-
tor might estimate the true likelihood of conviction and base her
offer on that likelihood. Alternatively, if defense counsel is capa-
ble of evaluating the risks objectively and bargaining aggressive-
ly for his client, the prosecutor could disclose the missing infor-
mation and rely on the negotiation process to achieve justice.
When, as in the second hypothetical scenario, defense counsel
is incapable of pressing his client's interests in the negotiation,
prosecutors cannot rely on defense counsel to help achieve the
trial approximation. Presumably, the prosecutor might assess
the likelihood of conviction herself and offer a plea that is appro-
priate for those risks. Yet, if the judgment of risks is skewed
because defense counsel's inadequacy is likely to continue to
hurt defendant at the trial stage," 4 then the prosecutor must
ponder a separate question that will be analyzed presently:'35
What should she do when she anticipates that counsel will be
inadequate or ineffective at trial?'36
132. Prosecutors must disclose Brady information that is material and has been
requested specifically by defense counsel or information that raises a reasonable
doubt, even if not specifically requested. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
110-13 (1976).
133. See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994) (requiring disclosure of prior state-
ments by prosecution witnesses only after the witnesses testify at trial).
134. This will often, but not always, be the case. Sometimes, counsel are lazy nego-
tiators and investigators, but dynamic and effective trial attorneys.
135. See infra Part III.E.2.
136. The efficiency models produce varying results. The theories holding that plea
bargaining is inevitable and definitionally good suggest that the prosecutor should
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2. Anticipating Ineffective Assistance
In many cases, a prosecutor who anticipates ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in the future will have the same temptation as
the prosecutor who faces bad lawyering in the plea-bargaining
process; namely, to take advantage of the defense lawyer's inad-
equacy by securing an unusually high plea agreement. But
sometimes, she faces an additional temptation: she may wish to
offer and accept a lower plea than usual in order to end the mat-
ter quickly.
Consider this scenario:
The prosecutor knows that the defense counsel has acted, and
is likely to act in the future, so ineffectively that the prosecu-
tor will have to raise the counsel's ineffectiveness at trial,
take remedial steps, or watch the conviction be reversed on
appeal.
137
By offering a plea, the prosecutor can prevent further inquiry
into defense counsel's conduct by the trial or appellate court. 3 '
take advantage of the situation. Easterbrook, in part, also encourages this approach,
because a plea beneficial to the prosecution will enhance the pleas deterrent effect.
See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 295-96 (discussing the importance of de-
terrence to prosecutors). Insofar as defense counsel's ineffectiveness eliminates
counsel's ability to act as a check on the system, however, any plea becomes prob-
lematic. The Easterbrook requirement that the fairness of pleas to defendants be
assured through the defense counsel's realistic estimate of the likely results at trial
is undermined when defense counsel fails to investigate. Similarly, counsel's decision
to accept any plea based on inertia or burnout undermines the theory's premise that
counsel's recommendations will depend solely on a realistic assessment of the risk.
The contract model would distinguish the two scenarios. It posits adequate in-
formation and aggressive bargaining by defense counsel as lynchpins for achieving
mutually beneficial results. See supra text accompanying note 82. A prosecutor can
remedy the defense counsel's failure to investigate by supplying the information nec-
essary for a realistic estimate by defense counsel, but counsel's burnout and tenden-
cy to accept any plea is not counteracted so easily. The prosecutor cannot be sure
that any plea agreement will be fair, within the definition of the theory, so long as
this defense counsel represents the defendant. The contract rationale thus would for-
bid the prosecutor to proceed with the plea until adequate defense counsel is in
place.
137. See, e.g., LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 11.10(c), at 590 (noting that
courts "will far more readily find incompetency where there has been 'an abdica-
tion-not an exercise-of professional judgment").
138. Appeals from guilty pleas are rare because defendants are unlikely to discover
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Moreover, the prosecutor may avoid having to take steps on her
own to bring the ineffective assistance to the court's atten-
tion."3 9 Hence, in this scenario, the prosecutor must consider
whether she should offer a deal that, in some respects, is simply
too good for the defendant given the facts of the case.
Unless the prosecutor is acting for self-serving reasons, such
as avoiding the personal unpleasantness of having to challenge
the lawyer's competence later on, 4 ' all of the efficiency models
and the empowerment model would sanction the low plea.'4 '
The prosecutor is making a reasonable judgment that accepting
a low plea ultimately will save resources-for example, by avoid-
ing an appeal or retrial--and will optimize deterrence. The de-
fendant too is better off, in the long run, than he would be with-
out the plea.42
The result is more problematic under some of the just result
models because the models take into account not only the interests
of the defendant and the prosecution, but also those of society in
the error in the trial court before the deadline for an appeal passes, See generally
id. § 21.5(b) (discussing time limitations on appealing a guilty plea). Numerous pro-
cedural obstacles make subsequent habeas corpus relief unlikely. See id. §§ 28.4-5
(detailing procedural impediments to obtaining habeas corpus relief). Having pled
guilty, the defendant probably also will never recognize, or be able to establish, his
attorney's past ineffectiveness. Any claim regarding the attorney's future ineffective-
ness could only be viewed as speculative. Moreover, even if the defendant could set
forth a claim, the plea under our scenario was unusually favorable, so the defendant
has little incentive to pursue the matter. The public-the loser in the too lenient
bargain-has no standing to challenge the plea.
139. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 69-72 (discussing situations in which the pros-
ecutor may need to advise the court of defense counsel's poor lawyering).
140. Such conduct by prosecutors is discussed under the rubric of "prosecutorial
agency costs" in Part III.H infra.
141. For purposes of the empowerment theory, the fact that counsel may be inef-
fective at trial does not mean the defendant cannot make a meaningful choice on
whether a plea offer is beneficial. One important caveat is in order: If the defendant
is pleading because counsel is ineffective--either because counsel has not given the
defendant information or because the defendant fears he cannot get a fair trial be-
cause of counsel's inadequacy-then the empowerment theory may call the plea into
question.
142. Even if the defendant could file and win an appeal, his only remedy is a new,
fair trial with effective counsel. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, §
11.7(a) (discussing the right to effective counsel on appeal). Because his case would
comprise the same facts, the prosecutor would only agree to a higher plea once the
defendant is represented by an effective lawyer. The defendant now has his trial
option, but for purposes of bargaining he is in a significantly worse position.
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obtaining socially desirable outcomes. For example, the trial ap-
proximation model suggests that there is some objectively appro-
priate result that the adversary system produces and that achiev-
ing this result should be the goal-whoever is, or is not, benefitted.
Lacking in our scenario is objectivity on the part of the parties
that, in effect, substitutes for the presence of judge and jury.
Stated another way, a judge would not acquit or lower a
defendant's sentence because of counsel's inadequacy; at most, the
judge would order a new trial. Because the trial approximation
model relies exclusively on the prosecutor to assure the approxi-
mation, it assumes that the prosecutor will make her judgment
based exclusively on the defendant's legal innocence or guilt.
Similarly, the equity and equalization theories also disapprove
of prosecutorial reliance on resource considerations. The equity
rationale requires the prosecutor to focus on standards that de-
fine what is fair for this type of defendant. The equalization jus-
tification focuses on how other defendants would be treated. Un-
der these just result models, therefore, the prosecutor should
only offer a plea that he would offer in the absence of the de-
fense counsel's flaws.
3. Inadequate but Technically "Effective" Assistance
Let us consider the converse of the situation that we have just
discussed:
The prosecutor knows that the defense counsel is a terrible,
though not constitutionally ineffective, trial lawyer and that
the government is likely to win at trial because of the advan-
tage the skill differential offers.
Should the prosecutor refuse to offer her normal plea, in favor of
a higher offer, because her chances of conviction are unusually
good? Alternatively, should she show some sympathy for the
defendant's plight by offering him a standard, or even lower-
143. In all criminal cases, there is a range of talent on both the prosecution and
the defense side that may be taken into account in plea bargaining. For purposes of
the above scenario, however, let us assume that the disparity in quality is unusually
great.
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than-standard, plea?
All the efficiency rationales and the empowerment rationale
would permit the higher offer.' 4 The defendant is receiving the
representation to which he is legally entitled. Indeed, he may
even have chosen counsel. Counsel's quality always affects the
likelihood of conviction. 45 Given the reality of this lawyer's
representation, the choice to plead is informed and voluntary. A
plea to the prosecutor's abnormally high offer may produce a
better result than would going to trial.
Probably only the Easterbrook model requires this result.
Under the Easterbrook model, the highest plea agreement possi-
ble maximizes deterrence of the crime. 46 In contrast, the pure
resource theories simply prefer plea over trial, a preference that
the lower offer would satisfy as well.'47
The equity and equalization models call for the prosecutor to
offer her normal plea. For reasons already discussed, tactical fac-
tors should not control. In contrast, the trial approximation ra-
tionale would require the prosecutor to maximize the offer. Accord-
ing to this rationale, the flaws of defense counsel that will hurt the
defendant at trial should hurt him at the bargaining stage as well.
A trial approximation model might recognize an exception where
defense counsel is not aggressive or active on his client's be-
half,'49 but that is not the case we have posited. The client is not
getting all he would wish, but he is receiving his due.
144. These models do not require the prosecutor to up the ante, but simply give her
the option to do so. The resources that might be committed to trial are saved under
the higher or lower plea. The defendant is in a position to negotiate, based on full
information, with counsel's assistance (for whatever it is worth). Justice thus can be
served both by a plea agreement in which the prosecutor takes advantage of her supe-
rior skill and by one in which she voluntarily exercises restraint in the negotiation.
145. See HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR:
PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS 237 (1977) (noting that "[slome attorneys have
more ability than others" and assuming that this should be taken into account in
negotiating); KARRASS, supra note 18, at 21 (establishing by way of a study that
skilled negotiators tend to achieve better results than less skilled negotiators).
146. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 308-10 (defending the legitimacy of
plea bargaining based upon its efficiency through its deterrent effect).
147. Under the contract theory, the prosecutor must decide what to offer based
exclusively on the state's interests, but there may be wiggle-room on whether plea
maximization always serves that interest.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 109, 111.
149. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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F. Protecting Defendants' Plea Bargaining Rights
Closely related to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
is the question of how prosecutors should act if they believe that
the defendant cannot rely on defense counsel in the plea-bar-
gaining process. This may occur either because laziness or some
external factor interferes with the normal attorney-defendant
relationship, or because agency costs prevent defense counsel
from doing his job.
1. Confronting an Imperfect Attorney-Client Relationship
The prosecutor has good reason to believe that the defense
counsel has not communicated his plea offer to the defendant.
The defendant may not be harmed except in the sense that
he is deprived of information and the opportunity to make a
choice.
For obvious reasons, the relationship between a defendant
and his lawyer is most relevant to the empowerment justifica-
tion for plea bargaining, which focuses on the defendant's state
of mind. The justification presumes that the defendant receives
information, can transmit information, and freely controls the
decision of whether to plead.15 If the prosecutor realizes that
the defendant is uninformed or under duress, then she may not
proceed to accept a plea.'51
150. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
151. But what is she to do? Under rules governing contacts with represented per-
sons, she may not communicate with the defendant directly. See supra note 131. The
prosecutor's only method for providing a duress-free environment may be to seek
judicial assistance ex parte. Presumably, the court would be within its authority to
meet with the defendant, to assure itself that the defendant is making voluntary
choices. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1456, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1993)
(approving, in theory, prosecutor's ability to obtain court approval to communicate
with defendant directly or under court's supervision), appeal after remand, 106 F.3d
309 (9th Cir. 1997).
This option may not be productive for scheduling reasons. See supra note 129.
No court appearance may be scheduled close in time to the offer. Requesting a spe-
cial hearing risks displeasing the court. Moreover, if the defendant has not been for-
mally notified of the hearing, his absence may not be grounds for a. bench warrant.
Thus, there is no guarantee that the defendant will appear or even that counsel will
tell him to be present.
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Interestingly, none of the other rationales for plea bargaining
presume the direct involvement of the defendant in the bargain-
ing. The just result theories look to whether the process achieves
an appropriate result. This can be accomplished even when the
defendant is uninformed or afraid, provided that either the de-
fense counsel acts aggressively or the prosecutor makes sure the
deal reached through plea bargaining is appropriate.'52
In the hypothetical scenario, the problem is not the potential
unfairness of a plea, but rather that the defendant has no
chance to accept it.' 53 Under a trial approximation model, the
failure of defense counsel to communicate with the defendant
should not concern the prosecutor. A trial can still achieve the
appropriate result.
The issues are more worrisome under the equity and equaliza-
tion justifications for plea bargaining. The consequence of forego-
ing a plea may produce a result that is inequitable or prejudicial
to the defendant-particularly if the factors the prosecutor con-
sidered in offering the plea would not be relevant at a trial."M
The prosecutor can perhaps avoid her dilemma by making the plea offer itself
in open court or by asking the court for assistance publicly. For the same practical
reasons as above, these approaches also may not solve the problem. Ultimately, the
prosecutor may have to confront the choice between foregoing the plea-bargaining
process, which itself undermines 'justice," and interfering with the right to counsel.
152. Depending on the theory, that may mean that the plea result approximates
what would happen at trial, is objectively fair, or is similar to what other defen-
dants would receive.
153. Whether the prosecutor may pursue the plea for the prosecution's own benefit
despite defense counsel's interference-for example, because the prosecution wants
the defendant's testimony as part of the bargain-does not turn on the issue of jus-
tice in plea bargaining. It is a practical question involving the defendant's right to
counsel, due process, and separate ethical issues-including the problem of communi-
cating with a represented party and interfering with his attorney-client relationship
(and confidentiality).
154. Under the equity and equalization theories, at least, the prosecutor may offer
the defendant a lenient plea bargain based on factors that have nothing to do with
the likelihood of conviction; for example, the defendant's family or employment situa-
tion, his past record, or the pleas that other defendants have received. See generally
supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing considerations in the equity
and equilization theories). Because none of this information would be relevant at
trial, the defendant may be convicted of a higher charge than the one to which the
prosecutor would accept a plea. The sentencing benefits the defendant might receive
because of the information might not be commensurate with the benefits of the less-
er plea.
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The prosecutor's obligation to justice may require taking steps
that will bring the plea to the defendant's attention 55 or will
achieve a substitution of counsel.'56
At first glance, defense counsel's conduct seems equally signif-
icant under the efficiency rationales. When counsel imposes
155. See supra notes 128 and 131. Steps to accomplish this include calling for a judi-
cial hearing at which she can announce the offer, filing an equivalent pleading (which
the lawyer may allow the defendant to see), or moving for counsel's replacement.
The prohibition against communicating directly with represented parties may
seem counterintuitive, because the professional rules against contacting represented
parties have as their goal protecting the client. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility, supra note 131. One aspect of that protection, however, is
that one attorney is not supposed to interfere with the attorney-client relationship of
the other by casting doubt on the attorney's competence or good will. See, e.g., STE-
PHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 93 (4th ed.
1995) (discussing rationales for the no-contact rules); supra note 131. Communica-
tions such as settlement offers are to be transmitted through counsel, so that coun-
sel can inform the client and explain the offer at the best time and in the best way
for the client. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at
Standard 3-4.1.
156. If counsel is appointed, then the court has a relatively free hand in substitut-
ing counsel. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (upholding the trial
court's refusal to grant the defendant's request for a continuance after the appoint-
ment of substitute counsel on the basis that the Sixth Amendment does not guaran-
tee the "right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship"). Even if the defendant
initially retained the lawyer, the court probably has the authority to intervene in
the attorney-client relationship when the proper administration of justice is threat-
ened. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158, 161 (1988) (overriding the
defendant's choice of counsel in favor of the goal of proper administration of justice);
cf United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 601 (1989) (approving an attorney-fee
forfeiture statute despite its potential interference with the defendants' choice of
counsel); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989)
(same).
There are significant practical problems associated with seeking the substitution
of counsel. Ordinarily, a court will order substitution only if the defendant wishes it
or the possibility exists that the defendant is too afraid of counsel to seek a change.
When the prosecutor considers initiating substitution, how certain must she be that
the defendant is frightened before she enlists the court's help? How can she obtain
more information about the defendant's state of mind without violating the no-con-
tact rules? Can she accomplish the interview or substitution of counsel without get-
ting the defendant killed? Most significantly, what should she do if the court de-
clines to intervene?
When the defendant himself approaches the prosecutor, the prosecutor must re-
main cognizant of the rules forbidding communications with represented persons. See
supra notes 131 and 155. She may tell him that she may not discuss the matter
with him while he is represented by the other lawyer, which, in theory, sometimes
may encourage the defendant to terminate the representation on his own.
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artificial obstacles to a bargained result, the process cannot
achieve its resource-saving goals. Yet, counsel's failure to pass
along the offer does not necessarily mean that counsel has ne-
glected the defendant's best interests; he simply has decided to
reject the offer in favor of trial. So long as defense counsel is
acting solely on the basis of his best assessment of risks and
rewards, none of the efficiency rationales requires, or encourag-
es, the prosecutor to intervene.
15 7
2. Defense Counsel Agency Costs
Numerous scholars have raised the problem of agency costs
that interfere with the full aggressiveness or client-orientation of
defense counsel.'58 For financial reasons, lawyers who are paid
a single fee, particularly an advance fee, have incentives to
157. Under the efficiency rationales, the reasons for defense counsel's interference
are particularly significant. Consider another scenario in which the prosecutor may
feel that defense counsel is not serving the defendant well:
Prosecutor receives a note from a jointly represented organized crime-con-
nected defendant that the defendant would like to speak to the prosecu-
tor privately about a plea (including cooperation), but that he is afraid of
his lawyer and co-defendant.
Like in the original scenario, the defendant's ability to make choices seems to be
constrained. Here, however, the defendant may have full information and, in theory,
can choose to plead or not-which is all that is required under most of the just re-
sult rationales. Yet the defendant potentially is harmed: first, a negotiated plea (e.g.,
testify against the co-defendant and receive leniency) may benefit the defendant, but
he may be too frightened to accept it; second, the negotiated plea might be improved
upon with a different defense lawyer who is willing to consider cooperation.
Under a pure resource-saving rationale, the scenario is problematic because it
artificially requires a trial that could be settled. Under the Easterbrook theory,
counsel's conduct may prevent the prosecutor from securing a plea acceptable to the
defendant that optimizes deterrence. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. A
contract approach assumes that the parties are bargaining based exclusively on their
own self interests. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Under all these efficien-
cy models, simply proceeding to trial would not satisfy "justice," because an appro-
priate bargain definitionally is a preferable result. The prosecutor thus may have an
obligation to ensure that the defendant has an opportunity to accept the plea free of
duress. That obligation may ultimately require seeking substitution of counsel.
158. In addition to the authorities cited infra, see, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 51,
at 1973-74 (attributing inadequacies in the system to inadequate pay of appointed
defense counsel); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1928, 1967 (defending plea bar-
gaining, but arguing that the system underprotects against defense counsel error).
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avoid trial and accept pleas that may not maximize their clients'
interests.159 Other defense counsel may act upon an institu-
tional preference for plea over trial because of caseload pres-
sures, 16 a desire to build a continuing relationship with prose-
cutors for other cases, 6' laziness,1 62 risk averseness," or a
need to maintain a good record of disposing of cases." Alter-
natively, some defense attorneys may be too ready to go to trial,
especially in high-visibility cases, in order to gain personal pub-
licity or trial experience.
165
In many situations, the defense attorney who capitulates to
personal or institutional interests to his client's detriment can
be analyzed in the same way as the lazy,166 ineffective, 67 or
inadequate defense counsel. 68 In other situations, the lawyer's
failings track those of the lawyer in the imperfect attorney-client
relationship.'69 I will not repeat those analyses here.
Occasionally, however, the prosecutor who confronts defense
counsel agency costs may need to consider remedies that are not
159. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1200 (discussing financial incentives of
defense counsel); Cox, supra note 86, at 428 ("The defense attorney may encourage a
plea bargain for reasons unrelated to his client's best interests."); Schulhofer, supra
note 1, at 54 (analyzing defense counsel's financial incentives); Schulhofer, supra
note 3, at 1988 (same).
160. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1201, 1248 (discussing incentives arising
from caseload pressures); Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 54 (same); Schulhofer, supra
note 3, at 1988 (same).
161. See, e.g., Green et al., supra note 1, at 511 n.122 (discussing cases of defense
counsel collusion with prosecutor); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1987 (disputing the
notion that defense counsel acts independently from prosecutor on client's behalf).
162. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 3, at 123 (discussing work avoidance by defense
counsel).
163. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1205 (discussing risks defense counsel
fear); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1988 (same).
164. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1198 (discussing the importance of dispo-
sition rate to defense counsel); Lynch, supra note 3, at 123 (illustrating internal
workload pressures on defense counsel); Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 54 (discussing
the importance of "moving cases"); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1988 (same).
165. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 53 (discussing attorneys' desire for pub-
licity); cf Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of
Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1627, 1660-63 (1996) (discussing generally a de-
fense attorney's personal motives in obtaining publicity in criminal trials).
166. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Parts III.E.1-2.
168. See supra Part III.E.3.
169. See supra Part III.F.1.
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available in the other situations. For example, when a defense
attorney overemphasizes pleas in his practice because of a desire
to please the prosecution, a prosecutor can make it clear that
she is indifferent between plea and trial. More simply, she can
inform defense counsel convincingly that she will not hold a de-
cision to try the case against the counsel in the future. 70 Em-
ploying this remedy is appropriate for prosecutors who operate
under a plea bargaining model that requires them to take
defendant's interests into account,' to act in the pursuit of
some objectively correct result, 2 or to assure that defense
counsel acts only in defendant's interests.3 The remedy
makes less sense if the prosecutor's only concern should be to
obtain pleas or to maximize the government's resources. Under
the empowerment model, the prosecutor should rely on this
remedy only if she believes the defendant will not be able to
receive and transmit information fully through this defense
counsel.
Similarly, when defense counsel is too risk averse or, con-
versely, is too desirous of going to trial because of the possible
publicity, he may still be acting with the defendant's bless-
ing.' 4 Under the theories that authorize pleas whenever the
defendant is making informed choices, such as the empower-
ment theory, no remedial measures seem necessary. Under a
trial approximation theory, the decision to go to trial too readily
should not concern the prosecutor,'75 but she should be unwill-
ing to accept a plea from a lawyer who is afraid to take a well-
calculated risk. Those rationales that seek to ensure justice
through counsel acting exclusively in the client's interests, such
170. I say "convincingly" because, as an empirical matter, prosecutors' offices may
hold decisions to try cases against defense attorneys. For the prosecutor's communi-
cation to be meaningful, she must persuade the defense lawyer to make the
plea/trial decision on the substantive merits.
171. For example, the defendant-equalization theory.
172. For example, the trial approximation and equity theories.
173. For example, the Easterbrook and contract theories.
174. The defendant may, for example, also be risk averse, or, he may bend to his
lawyer's desire for publicity as a cost of obtaining better counsel than he could oth-
erwise retain.
175. That is because the defendant will receive a trial and therefore is as well off
as he could be.
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as the contract theory, lead to a similar resolution. The prosecu-
tor may not accept the plea in the risk averseness scenario, but
presumably would not be troubled by pursuing whatever results
from a trial.'76
G. Protecting the Public Interest in Trials
One general criticism of plea bargaining is that it eliminates
the public aspect of criminal prosecutions.'77 Insofar as crimi-
nal trials serve to illuminate wrongdoing by the police, prosecu-
tor, or some other agency of government, accepting plea bargains
serves to cover up the misconduct.'78
When a well-intentioned 79 prosecutor offers and accepts a
plea bargain in such a case, she may act for the very purpose of
avoiding the exposition of the governmental action:
The prosecutor believes the defendant is guilty, based on
176. The difficult issues arise under the plea-bargaining justifications that concep-
tualize pleas not solely as alternatives to trial, but also as socially beneficial results
that prosecutors should seek in preference to trial because they save resources, opti-
mize deterrence (e.g., the Easterbrook theory), or achieve a fairer result for the de-
fendant (e.g., the equity and defendant-equalization theories). All of these justifica-
tions assume that, in large measure, prosecutors control the pleas. In the scenario
involving the overly litigious defense counsel, however, the prosecutor lacks the abili-
ty to force the appropriate result. Her remedies are limited to helping defense
counsel see the light, through persuasion or information, or bringing legitimate pres-
sure upon defense counsel to reassess his position-including, if necessary, raising
the matter with the court.
If the defendant ultimately insists on going to trial, the court's hands, too, are
tied. But the court can at least make sure the defendant understands his options. If
defense counsel's overlitigiousness comes from a desire to gain trial experience, the
threat of judicial admonishment may have an effect. If it is based on counsel's spe-
cial trial skill, on which the client has reason to rely, the court's intervention may
have little effect.
177. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 35, at 71 ("Plea bargaining sacrifices ... public
benefits of the trial process."); Lynch, supra note 3, at 116 ("Plea bargaining, by its
very nature, is a closed-door affair that is not readily amenable to observation by
outsiders.").
178. See generally Gifford, supra note 35, at 71 (discussing the public benefits of
trials); Kipnis, supra note 3, at 556-57 (noting the benefits of a jury trial); cf Fiss,
supra note 16, at 1085 (disapproving of civil settlements because of their effect in
eliminating the public aspects of litigation that help produce justice).
179. The problem of action by the prosecutor based on a personal agenda is dis-
cussed later under the rubric of prosecutor agency costs. See infra Part III.H. Here,
I consider conduct by the prosecutor based on bona fide policy considerations.
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overwhelming evidence. But she knows that the defense
counsel will cross-examine the police officers who conducted a
search and will be able to show that several members of the
police force are racist. She fears that this will undermine
public confidence." °
Or, she may be seeking to protect against acquittal of a guilty
defendant:
In the above scenario, the prosecutor suspects that some of
the evidence might be excluded based on an illegal police
search (although she does not believe that it should be sup-
pressed).181
Finally, she may have municipal interests, other than simply the
interest in conviction of guilty defendants, at heart:
The prosecutor knows that the defendant has sued, or plans
to sue, the city and arresting police officers for police brutali-
ty. The success of the suit is likely to depend, in part, on
whether the defendant is acquitted or convicted. To save the
taxpayers the expense of the suit and potential liability, the
prosecutor is considering offering dismissal or a reduced plea
in exchange for the defendant's agreement to drop the law-
suit.
In each of these hypotheticals, the public has an interest in
learning of the governmental misconduct. At the same time, the
public also has an interest in the completion of a plea. How
should the prosecutor determine where plea-bargaining justice
lies?"'
180. Cf. Scroggins v. Missouri, 859 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing the
prosecutor's acceptance of a guilty plea in lieu of making disclosures about police
department corruption).
181. Cf Alschuler, supra note 1, at 81 (discussing a prosecutor's reactions to a sim-
ilar scenario).
182. Public trials, however, do not universally carry with them significant public
benefits. In routine cases, the public's interest is in assuring that the correct person
is punished appropriately, a goal that plea bargains may achieve equally well. Ordi-
narily, the public interest in a visible trial is heightened only when some significant
1998] 1179
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1121
The hypotheticals share several features. Prosecutor and de-
fense counsel both are fully informed, can bargain aggressively,
can make realistic assumptions about the likelihood of conviction,
and will make decisions based on their own side's best interests.
The presence of external considerations thus should not be rele-
vant to the empowerment or resource preservation models.
Several of the plea-bargaining rationales assume that the
prosecutor will base her offer primarily on the defendant's factu-
al or legal innocence." Under an equalization-among-defen-
dants rationale, for example, the external considerations should
play a part in the prosecutor's decision only if they would also
affect the likelihood of conviction. The possibility that evidence
will be excluded is a relevant consideration; the fear that racism
will be exposed is relevant only if it may affect the trial; and the
possibility of a secondary lawsuit should not play a role in the
prosecutor's plea offer.
The equity model precludes prosecutorial reliance on tactical
and resource considerations. The sole issues for the prosecutor
should be what the defendant has done and what the
defendant's situation is. In the hypothetical scenarios, only the
fact that the defendant may already have been battered by the
police is potentially relevant to that calculus. However, if it is
relevant under the prosecutor's standards, it should count only
as an equitable consideration that improves the bargain the de-
fendant receives, not as a rationale for an unusual willingness of
the prosecutor to offer a plea at all.
Because the participants in the bargaining process can bargain
fully and aggressively, any settlement seems legitimate under the
Easterbrook and contract models. Easterbrook, however, assumes
that the prosecutor will make her decision of what to offer and
accept based on the state's interests in optimizing deterrence."
government misconduct is at issue or when the publicized nature of the event cre-
ates the public perception that justice may be dispensed unequally.
183. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
factual and legal innocence and the importance this consideration holds for prosecu-
tors under a just result theory).
184. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 295-96 (discussing the importance
of deterrence to prosecutors). Similar reasoning should govern the prosecutor under
the contract model, with one notable difference. The issue for the prosecutor is
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In the second scenario, involving the potentially suppressible
evidence, the prosecutor clearly acts within bounds in anticipating
the possibility that her case will be weakened. In the first and
third hypotheticals, the relationship of the external considerations
to deterrence is more attenuated, but also exists. The potential
deterioration of public confidence or expenditure of funds other-
wise available for law enforcement both may affect future prosecu-
tions. The Easterbrook theory thus probably would allow the pros-
ecutor to take those considerations into account. 18
H. Prosecutorial Agency Costs
The problem of prosecutorial agency costs need not detain us
long. Like defense counsel, prosecutors have institutional incen-
tives to offer overly lenient pleas in some cases and to resist of-
fering fair pleas in others. Unlike the public interest dilemmas
discussed above, the reasons for the prosecutor's decision in
these cases are personal to the prosecutor or the prosecutor's
office. For example, a prosecutor may offer pleas freely out of a
desire to maintain her reputation for securing convictions, to
ease workload pressures and enhance job satisfaction, or to
maintain a good relationship with the private bar to enhance
future employment possibilities.'86 Conversely, like defense
whether the external considerations bear on her "client's interests," so that a plea
bargain that covers up the governmental misconduct furthers those interests. Per-
haps more than under the other theories discussed thus far, the public-interest argu-
ment has force because the nature of the prosecutor's clients is unclear. See Zach-
arias, supra note 7, at 56-57 (discussing prosecutors' constituencies). Simple resort to
the underlying rationale for plea bargaining cannot tell the prosecutor how to act,
unless the theory also prioritizes what sector of the public she is required to protect.
185. The trial approximation model reduces to a similar quandary. At first glance,
the external considerations, like under the equity model, seem relevant only if they
would also affect the likelihood of conviction. Arguably, however, no plea bargain
would approximate the results at trial in these scenarios, because trial would include
public exposure of the misconduct. For the theory to be coherent, each prosecutor
cannot be left individually to decide whether the trial approximation notion is limit-
ed to predicting conviction or acquittal of the defendant or whether it also encom-
passes the public benefits of a trial process-including the "public benefits" of avoid-
ing negative effects on particular public agencies if misconduct is exposed. To be
workable, the theory must define itself.
186. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 1, at 111 (discussing prosecutor's interest in
pleasing potential employers); Green et al., supra note 1, at 507 (discussing
prosecutor's personal incentives); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1987 (discussing
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counsel, a prosecutor might want to try high visibility cases for
fun, to enhance her reputation within the office, or to obtain
publicity.
8 7
The Easterbrook and contract models and all the just result
models, except the empowerment theory, forbid prosecutors to
act on these considerations. Each model requires prosecutors to
make their decisions solely on the basis of the government's in-
terests or some other nonpersonal lodestar."
The prosecutor who follows an empowerment model can justi-
fy offering overly lenient pleas but would be forbidden to refuse
to offer a plea, because a refusal to deal vitiates the assumption
that the defendant can have input into the plea process. Similar-
ly, the pure resource/efficiency model might sanction an overly
lenient plea, because avoidance of trial is the key,"9 but would
forbid the decision to overlitigate.
IV. WHAT DOES JUSTICE MEAN?
The paradigm of prosecutorial justice in plea bargaining con-
sists of the prosecutor who voluntarily dismisses a case against
an innocent defendant. Yet, as we have seen, a myriad of more
complicated scenarios exist in which some observers might ex-
pect a prosecutor to depart from her typical regime in offering
and accepting pleas. Because the prosecutor represents varying
interests and constituencies,"' it is no easy matter for her to
identify just behavior. She cannot do so without some method
for ordering priorities among the constituencies and interests.
Of course, sometimes the existence of multiple priori-
prosecutor's agency costs).
187. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1187 (discussing some prosecutors' tenden-
cy to seek trial at all costs against highly visible defense attorneys); Easterbrook,
supra note 2, at 300-01 (discussing reputational interests of prosecutors); cf Cole &
Zacharias, supra note 165, at 1660-63 (discussing self-interested reasons for which
lawyers seek publicity).
188. For example, the likelihood of conviction, the fair result, or the optimal deter-
rence solution.
189. Of course, under a more sophisticated resource model, such as the Easterbrook
theory, prosecutors would need to recognize that saving trial resources in the short
run might impact negatively on deterrence in the long run.
190. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 56-57 (describing a prosecutor's various con-
stituencies).
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ties-such as convicting the guilty and being fair to defen-
dants-may require some balancing of interests. But it is not ob-
vious that one can always weigh or compare the competing in-
terests. For example, an increase in the possibility that a defen-
dant is factually or legally innocent does not necessarily mean
justice requires a lower plea offer. Arguably, the prosecutor who
still believes in the defendant's guilt should proceed aggressively
even against overwhelming odds.'9 ' Similarly, increasingly
compelling equitable arguments concerning a defendant's per-
sonal situation may be relevant to sentencing,'92 but do not
necessarily mean that a prosecutor should revise the pleadable
offense along a sliding scale; society's interest in maximum de-
terrence might trump the defendant's interests no matter how
sad the defendant's tale. It therefore is unsatisfying to conclude
simply that prosecutors should recognize the conflicting interests
and adjust their relative importance on a case-by-case basis. Yet,
the current professional codes do precisely that in requiring
prosecutors to do justice."'
This Article's analysis has suggested the importance of assign-
ing priorities to the varying interests ex ante. One cannot ac-
complish that simply by listing the goals prosecutors should pur-
sue. Such an approach ultimately would come to parallel the
unsatisfying discretionary approach of the current codes.
Prosecutors can best understand their priorities by identifying
the model, or theory, of plea bargaining under which they oper-
ate. As we have seen, the models carry with them assumptions
about the conflicting interests that enable prosecutors to resolve
many of the dilemmas they might face. By definition, a form of
justice is served when prosecutors follow the model. Not every-
one will agree that the best result has occurred in an individual
case, because critics might prefer an alternative model that in-
cludes a different prioritization of interests." But at least
191. Whether she should do so depends on whether her primary goal is preserving
resources, on the one hand, or pursuing policies of optimization of deterrence or
equalization among defendants, on the other hand.
192. See the examples listed supra Part IH.D.
193. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
194. Some, for example, may prefer an Easterbrook policy that maximizes deter-
rence. Others focus primarily on the danger of convicting an innocent defendant and,
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there can be agreement that the prosecutor has done her job and
has pursued a legitimate path. Criticism of the result must focus
on the model, or prioritization, rather than on the individual
prosecutor's conduct.
Implicit in this conclusion is the notion that individual prose-
cutors should be constrained in their ability to pick and choose
among the models. Individual prosecutorial discretion in select-
ing the underlying theory for plea bargaining would lead to the
same criticisms as the status quo; namely, that prosecutors can
justify any result simply by choosing a model that produces the
result they desire. Moreover, such discretion shifts, rather than
solves, prosecutors' ethical dilemmas. Instead of having to
choose among interests and priorities without guidance, individ-
ual prosecutors would be left to choose among models that set
priorities-again without guidance.
These observations lead to what now seems like an obvious
conclusion. Prosecutors' offices should, in their administrative
regulations and manuals, identify the model of plea bargaining
that they expect individual prosecutors to use.'95 By taking
this step, the agencies can offer individual prosecutors guidance
in approaching plea-bargaining dilemmas, without needing to
anticipate the infinite number of moral dilemmas that may arise
in plea bargaining.' 6
At the same time, identifying a governing plea-bargaining
theory prevents individual prosecutors from imposing a misguid-
ed view of justice upon defendants and the public.'97 It both
therefore, will prefer an equity theory that may release, or be lenient to, even poten-
tially guilty defendants. Cf DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 58 (1988) (noting
that the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard risks allowing 100 guilty persons
to go free in order to protect a single innocent defendant).
195. Concomitantly, this proposal assures that individual prosecutors will be in-
formed of the selection and will be provided sufficient training to understand the
plea-bargaining theory.
196. Although a few prosecutorial agencies may have adopted internal regulations
governing the practice of plea bargaining, this author has not located any current
policies that include a substantive elaboration of the bases on which pleas should be
offered. See, e.g., 7 THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, ch. 16 (Supp. 1993-2) (setting
forth federal plea-bargaining policies); cf White, supra note 1, at 442 (noting that
most prosecutors have not "established any formal rules or procedures governing
plea bargaining").
197. For example, the decision to prosecute or to show leniency to animal rights
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enables a prosecutorial agency to control its agents and makes
the agency responsible for doing so. 9' The very existence of a
plea-bargaining policy itself may serve to equalize treatment
among defendants.'99
I do not take a positiov on whether a prosecutor's office
should be required to publish its plea-bargaining policy, for
there are good arguments pro and con. The achievement of the
above objectives do not depend on the open publication of the
guidelines. The conduct of individual prosecutors probably can
be constrained sufficiently if the office communicates its guide-
lines to prosecutors, formally or informally, and imposes supervi-
sory controls that insure the standards are followed. Maintain-
ing secrecy of the guidelines would help avoid distracting litiga-
tion over the guidelines' implementation and make it easier for
prosecutors' offices to amend their policies over time. Confidenti-
ality also would afford individual prosecutors some flexibility in
interpreting the spirit of the rules, without feeling excessive
pressure to follow their strict letter.
On the other hand, publishing the guidelines would produce
several public benefits. First, it might render prosecutors' offices
more accountable. Elected officials who administer prosecutors'
offices prefer to insulate themselves from criticism in individual
cases by retaining the right to pick and choose among plea-bar-
gaining theories."'0 Requiring prosecutors' offices to "declare"
their position exposes agency priorities to public debate, thereby
activists to the maximum extent possible.
198. For example, once a plea-bargaining theory has been selected and is followed,
the agency can no longer blame individual proaecutors for unpopular action. Nor can
the chief prosecutor avoid responsibility simply by saying that she stands behind the
discretionary decisions of her subordinate. The agency itself will be accountable for
the selection of the theory that the prosecutorial conduct followed.
199. Because all prosecutors in a given office will be required to follow the same
plea-bargaining principles, there is less likelihood of disparate treatment of similar
defendants by different prosecutors.
200. In any individual case, it is easy to justify a particular result by referring to
some theory of plea bargaining. When a deterrence or contract model fails to explain
a bargain, an equity or equalization theory might. Thus, for "political" purposes, a
prosecutor would prefer to have all the rationales available as potential justifications
for her conduct. The identification of an office theory is designed to help individual
prosecutors determine just conduct in advance, rather than to help them defend
their conduct after the fact.
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creating the possibility of change if the public truly desires a
different approach.2 '
Second, publicly identifying the plea-bargaining policy ex ante
would facilitate communication between individual prosecutors
and defense attorneys.2 2 Enabling defense attorneys to under-
stand prosecutor's perspectives toward plea bargaining enhances
their ability to communicate information that would be relevant
to a prosecutor.21 3 Perhaps more important, by helping defense
attorneys know whether prosecutors will even consider informa-
tion they transmit, the identification of a theory will make coun-
sel more willing to take the risk of communicating at all. In the
long run, this would facilitate the process and make it easier to
achieve appropriate bargains.
One significant question remains: Should prosecutor's offices
be able to adopt more than a single plea-bargaining model for
use in different situations? Earlier, for example, this Article sug-
gested that a prosecutor who follows an efficiency rationale ordi-
narily could not take equitable factors into account unless an
equity rationale has been built into the model.2 By and large,
adopting multiple models would lead to incoherent plea bargain-
ing because prosecutors would be faced with inconsistent man-
dates and assumptions-for example, the inconsistent notion
that prosecutors should maximize deterrence, but approximate
likely trial results. As with any policy, however, there is room
for limited exceptions that do not swallow the rule.
Indeed, carried to their logical extent, some of the models
would produce nonsensical results if applied in a vacuum. For
201. Arguably, exposing prosecutorial policies to public debate can have a negative
effect as well. The result may be politically motivated attacks upon incumbents that
lead to policies based more on electoral issues than on sound prosecutorial practice.
202. As I have discussed elsewhere, the legal system depends on lawyers being
able to maintain a discourse in which they can understand the words and actions of
their adversaries and fit them into a course of dealing. See Fred C. Zacharias, Speci-
ficity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 223, 231, 269 (1993) (discussing one
function of professional codes as facilitating the legal process by establishing norms
lawyers can use in dealing with one another).
203. See id. at 269-70 (discussing the effect of a vague standard of justice on com-
munications between prosecution and defense).
204. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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example, a resource-saving rationale alone might require prose-
cutors to drop all charges because that is most efficient." 5 Sim-
ilarly, a trial approximation theory, separated entirely from re-
source-saving logic,0 6 would require prosecutors always to go
to trial; that would produce a universally just result.20 7 Most of
the models assume some level of interaction with other social
policies or plea-bargaining theories.
What is key to this Article's proposal is that a prosecutor's
office be specific, because only specific guidelines can force the
agency and individual prosecutors to justify plea-bargaining de-
cisions in a coherent way. The offices probably should be able to
adopt balanced plea-bargaining models that encompass and
prioritize among more than one theory. The above analysis also
would accommodate an office that authorizes specific exceptions
to the routine of its chosen model for particular situations or an
office that adopts procedures for making exceptions in unforesee-
able situations. If a balanced model truly is intended to help
prosecutors resolve their plea-bargaining dilemmas, however,
the model must define its priorities clearly. Its definition of jus-
tice ordinarily must prevail.
Does this Article's proposal resolve the question "how can
prosecutors do justice" by arbitrarily defining justice as "whatev-
er the agency says?" There are two reasons why the proposal is
not simply semantic. First, and most important, it must be re-
membered that an alternative to a plea exists that, with caveats
I have discussed elsewhere, °8 provides a socially accepted form
205. The meaning of efficiency as used here is simply the savings of judicial and
prosecutorial resources. As the Easterbrook theory makes clear, other notions of effi-
ciency would encompass social interests such as deterrence and punishment of
wrongdoers. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 308-10 (discussing the im-
portance of deterrence to prosecutors).
206. Of course, most formulations of the trial approximation theory are not so lim-
ited. They seek to combine the benefits of achieving trial-like results with the bene-
fits of saving judicial and prosecutorial resources. See supra note 64 and accompany-
ing text.
207. In other words, if achieving the precise result of trial is the only goal, the
best way of being certain of achieving the result is to complete every trial. The rea-
sons the theory accommodates plea bargaining must either be to save resources or
to accommodate other goals of plea bargaining-such as achieving equitable results.
208. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 53-56 (analyzing what constitutes justice in an
adversary system).
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of justice; namely, trial. A prosecutor's failure to plea bargain in
the way critics wish does not deprive defendants of the option of
pursuing the alternative. Justice, in some form, is available no
matter what the agency decrees. °9
The second reason is related. The models discussed in this
Article reflect justifications for permitting the parties to avoid
trial.210 Under each model, society ends up better off by encour-
aging some pleas. When a prosecutorial agency chooses a model
and satisfies its premises, the agency presumably enhances the
total value society derives from the criminal adjudication pro-
cess. Another model might be better-might further enhance
society's benefit-but that still leaves the fact that the choice is
an improvement. It is fair to say that adopting some model
achieves justice when compared to the status quo.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article's proposal, in the end, is simple and easy to im-
plement. We should require prosecutors' offices to prescribe a
primary theory of plea bargaining to which all of its employees
should adhere.
Even if prosecutors' offices refuse,21' individual prosecutors
may find it useful to subscribe to a theory. Individual action
does not promote consistency throughout the agency, but it has
the two-fold benefit of providing the individual with a standard
to follow and of enabling her to deal with concrete dilemmas in
a nonarbitrary way. Prosecutors who act in a purely discretion-
ary manner in each case are likely to develop the philosophy
that any action they take is equally valid."2 This attitude
209. The one exception to this syllogism is when a trial judge, through institutional
persuasion, coerces prosecutors and defense counsel into a bargain. See, e.g.,
CLIFFORD IRVING, TRIAL: A NOVEL 49 (Summit ed. 1990) (describing a fictionalized
account of judicial coercion); Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1237-38 (discussing mecha-
nisms used by trial judges to coerce pleas). Such conduct effectively deprives a de-
fendant of a realistic option through which he may achieve a "just" trial.
210. Conversely, in seeking to justify plea bargaining, the models implicitly assume
that there is a societal interest in the alternative; namely, having trials. See general-
ly Gifford, supra note 35, at 70-71 (discussing the public benefits of criminal trials);
Kipnis, supra note 3, at 556-57 (same).
211. In the real world, it would not be surprising to find elected officials, such as
chief prosecutors, declining to take a stand or declining to close off future options.
212. Cf Zacharias, supra note 7, at 48 (discussing the effect of prosecutorial discre-
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renders them subject to corruption, both in a financial and
institutional sense.213 Alternatively, such prosecutors become
more prone to manipulation by defense counsel or other exter-
nal influences, because any argument that third parties make
to them may seem logical in the abstract. In the long run,
society is far better off when prosecutors are self-conscious
about their decision making-when they reflect and try to act
in a consistent way. This Article's analysis attempts to provide
them with the means to do so.
Following the procedures this Article proposes will not satisfy
all critics. Indeed, the proposal that prosecution offices and in-
dividual prosecutors adopt a plea-bargaining theory does not
purport to address the larger issue of whether plea bargaining
itself should be allowed. Nor can the proposal assure that, in
any given case, it will produce the particular result that a ma-
jority of observers would prefer. It will, however, produce a justi-
fiable, predictable result that should not vary dramatically from
day to day or prosecutor to prosecutor.
Perhaps equally important, the results of plea bargaining in
particular cases will be consistent with the rationale for which
each community allows plea bargaining. This Article's proposal
recognizes the possibility that the chosen plea-bargaining theory
can be changed administratively or through the electorate.214
In a sense, making the choice among the viable plea-bargaining
theories itself helps produce sonre of the theories' goals: It pro-
motes reasonable, efficient, and consistent treatment of defen-
dants. In the complicated world of criminal process, perhaps
that is the closest to justice that we can come.
tion on prosecutors' ability to justify all results); Zacharias, supra note 202, at 250
(describing how the prosecutorial 'justice" standard allows different prosecutors to
'justify diametrically opposite conduct").
213. By institutional corruption, I refer to the possibility that prosecutors will ac-
cept less than societally optimal results for reasons, including workload pressures or
personal feelings about defense counsel, that reflect their personal interests or those
of the bureaucracy of which they are a part.
214. In other words, if an agency's choice of plea-bargaining theory is perceived as
misguided, that choice can become a political issue. On the one hand, prosecutorial
policy should not be overly subject to the whims of the majority. On the other, to
the extent there is a serious theoretical debate concerning the appropriate goals of
the criminal law, public input should be welcomed.
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